THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF TITLE VII ACTIONS
INTRODUCTION

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) 1 was enacted
for the purpose of eliminating employment discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' In order to effectuate
this statutory scheme, Congress formed the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission)3 which has the power
to investigate written charges of discrimination filed with it by persons who claim to be aggrieved. 4 If after such an investigation, the
Commission determines that reasonable cause exists to substantiate
the allegations in the charge, then it is empowered to attempt conciliation between the parties. 5 Prior to 1972, the EEOC had not been
granted enforcement powers to remedy employer violations of Title
I Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 82-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 253 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 200 0 e to 2000e-1 7 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2 00 0 e-2 (1970); see H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2401.
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e4 (Supp. V 1975).
4 Id. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975). That section provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be
aggrieved . . . alleging that an employer . .. has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the Commission shall serve a notice of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment
practice) on such employer . . . (hereinafter referred to as "respondent") within
ten days, and shall make an investigation thereof ....
If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is not reasonable cause to believe
that the charge is true, it shall dismiss the charge and promptly notify the person claiming to be aggrieved and the respondent of its action ....
If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to
believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any
such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion. ...
The language of the original enactment provided in pertinent part:
Whenever it is charged in writing under oath by a person claiming to be
aggrieved . . . that an employer . . . has engaged in an unlawful employment
practice, the Commission shall furnish such employer . . . with a copy of such
charge and shall make an investigation of such charge ....
If the Commission
shall determine, after such investigation, that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any
such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970). Compare id. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975) with id. § 2000e5(a) (1970).
5 Id. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975), reprinted in note 4 supra.
493

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8: 493

VII arising out of individual charges; the EEOC was authorized only
to seek conciliation. 6 If this proved unsuccessful, the charging party
was given notice of the right to bring a civil action for injunctive and
7
remedial relief.
In 1972, Congress noted "that the voluntary approach [had]
failed to eliminate employment discrimination" and that "the time
[had] come to bring an end to job discrimination once and for all.",,
To remedy this continued and often blatant discrimination, Congress
passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (EEOA)9
which gave the EEOC the power to bring civil actions for injunctive
and remedial relief. 10 Although Congress suggested, in its report accompanying the bill, that private actions be discouraged," they are
12
not prohibited under the EEOA.
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970), reprinted in note 4 supra.

' 42 U.S.C. § 2 000e-5(e),(g) (1970). Section 2000e-5(e) provided in pertinent part:
If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission . . . , the

Commision has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with this subchapter, the Commission shall so notify the person aggrieved and a civil action may,
within thirty days thereafter, be brought against the respondent named in the
charge (1) by the person claiming to be aggrieved ....
Section 2 000e-5(g) provided:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the
complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate
SH.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 3, 5, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2139, 2141.

9 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2 00 0 e-1 7 (Supp. V 1975)) (amending Title VII).
10 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f),(g) (Supp. V 1975). Section 2000e-5(f) provides in pertinent

part:
(1) If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission .
the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation
agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil
action ....
The relevant language of section 2000e-5(g) remains the same as that contained in the
1964 Act. See note 7 supra. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970) with 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975).
11 118 CONG. REC. 7565 (1972).
12 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. V 1975). Section 2000e-5(f) provides in pertinent
part:
If a charge filed with the Commission pursuant to subsection (b) of this section
is dismissed by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from
the filing of such charge .... the Commission has not filed a civil action under
this section .. . , or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission . .. shall so
notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such
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Since the passage of these two acts, serious questions have arisen
concerning the proper scope of both private and EEOC causes of
action under Title VII. Is there a fundamental distinction between
private and EEOC actions regarding the permissible scope of the
complaint? Should the pleadings be limited to the allegations contained in the administrative charge, or can they be expanded to encompass information discovered during the course of the Commission's investigation? Finally, what exactly are the bounds of that investigation? Although there is a considerable variety of approaches
to the resolution of these issues, some overriding principles have
emerged. This Comment will demonstrate that the causes of action
are not limited to allegations concerning injury to the named plaintiff.
It will be shown that the scope of the judicial complaint can be framed
either by the nature and extent of the EEOC investigation or by a
broad interpretation of the administrative charge. In addition, it will
become clear that certification of an action as a class suit permits the
determination of issues relating to classes other than that of which the
charging party is a member. Furthermore, the EEOC, since it sues in
the public interest, has standing to seek redress of grievances beyond
those which could be remedied by individual or class suits.
THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF A PRIVATE ACTION

UNDER TITLE VII

After an individual has filed a charge with the EEOC, it is empowered to make an investigation to determine reasonable cause to
believe the truth of the charge, although it need not do so. 13 If there
is a finding of reasonable cause, the EEOC may institute conciliation
proceedings between the parties, 14 but again, it is not required to do
so. 15 These statutory options of the EEOC, however, are not preconditions to the charging party's right to institute a civil action; all that
is required is that he file a charge and receive a right-to-sue notice
notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the
charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved....
13 id. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970)). Although the statutory language is phrased in mandatory terms, in practice there is no
sanction provided for a failure to investigate. Compare id. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975)
with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973).
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970)).
15Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(a) (1970)) with Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 406 F.2d 399, 402-03 (5th Cir.
1969). One circuit has held, however, that it was the intent of Congress that the EEOC
make an effort to conciliate where there has been a determination of probable cause.
Fekete v. United States Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331, 336 (3d Cir. 1970).
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from the agency. 1 6 Cases have held that where an investigation has
taken place, that investigation may frame the scope of the complaint. 17 For this reason, it is important to examine the nature and extent of a Commission investigation.
The EEOC is empowered to initiate an investigation upon the
filing of a charge by an individual alleging discrimination by an
employer. 18 The two provisions of Title VII in the 1964 Act which
defined the investigatory powers of the EEOC 19 were adopted with
the intention of protecting employers charged with unlawful discrimination from being subjected to investigations not related to a
charge.20 Consequently, the permissible scope of an EEOC investigation was limited to the acquisition of information which "relates to
unlawful employment practices covered by this subchapter and is
relevant to the charge under investigation."2 1 Despite this apparent
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973).
E.g., Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970). For a discussion of Sanchez and similar cases, see notes 97-125 infra and accompanying text.
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Snpp. V 1975).
19 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-8(a),-9(a) (1970). Section 2000e-9 was totally rewritten by the
EEOA. See note 62 infra. Compare id. § 2000e-9 (1970) with id. § 2000e-9 (Supp. V
1975). Section 2000e-8(a) defines what the EEOC can gather in its investigation simply
by demand:
the Commission or its designated representative shall at all reasonable times
have access to, for the purposes of examination, and the right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to unlawful employment practices covered by this subchapter and is relevant to the
charge under investigation.
Id. § 2000e-8(a) (1970). Section 2000e-9(a) (1970) provided that
[f]or the purposes of any investigation of a charge filed under the authority
contained in section 2000e-5 of this title, the Commission shall have authority
to examine witnesses under oath and to require the production of documentary
evidence relevant or material to the charge under investigation.
When an employer failed to comply with the EEOC's demands for evidence, the Commission was empowered to go to federal district court to obtain a determination of what
was a proper subject of investigation. See id.§ 2000e-9(b) (1970).
Since the language of both sections 8(a) and 9(a) was very similar, it is unclear why
both were needed to effectuate the purposes of the act.
20 Based in part upon the exhortations of Senator Dirksen, "'aportion of the language of Section 709(a) was changed from 'relates to any matter under investigation or
in question' to the enacted language . . . 'relevant to the charge under investigation.' "
Motorola, Inc. v. McLain, 484 F.2d 1339, 1343 n.1 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
936 (1974); see 110 CONG. REC. 2571-73 (1964); note 21 infra and accompanying text.
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1970) (emphasis added). On February 8, 1964, Congressman Celler introduced an amendment to the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1964. This
amendment was intended to limit the investigatory powers of the EEOC. 110 CONG.
REC. 2571, 2573 (1964). The language of Celler's amendment as adopted was identical
to those words which prescribe the investigatory powers of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Id. at 2572. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1970) with 29 U.S.C.
§ 161(1) (1970). The statutory change was made, in the words of Congressman Goodell,
16
17
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narrowing of the EEOC's investigatory powers, courts have construed
broadly the language of Title VII.2 2 Under the original enactment, an
employer could petition a district court to set aside or modify an
EEOC demand for evidence. 2 3 This provision was eliminated by the
EEOA, so that now an employer's only immediate recourse is a petition to the EEOC to revoke its demand for evidence. 24 The EEOC
remains entitled to petition a federal district court for enforcement of
25
its subpoenas.
The contours of relevance within the meaning of the Act were
examined in Graniteville Co. v. EEOC,26 where two black employees
27
had filed a charge alleging discriminatory practices by the company.
No specific " 'names, incidents, dates, jobs, places or related information' " were outlined in the charge. 28 The EEOC undertook an investigation requesting job classification codes, hiring dates, and entry
level job positions of all employees. 29 Graniteville refused to comply
with this request, and brought "a Petition to Set Aside the Demand"
in federal district court. 3 0 The district court set aside the demand for
evidence, finding, in part, that the charge was invalid because it did
not allege specific acts of discrimination and that the EEOC investigation was bevond its statutory authority "and irrelevant to investgation of the charge.

'
"31

The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the charge need not
as "a limiting phrase confining and restricting the Commission's authority to relevant
evidence." 110 CONG. REC. 2573 (1964). In recommending that the language be
changed, Congressman Taft stated that
the investigatory powers that are involved in the present section of the TaftHartley Act are fair and adequate to take care of any investigation necessary

.... [W]e went into the matter of various precedents for investigation and we
found that reasonable access . . .-but only reasonable access-had been ruled
upon favorably under the present language of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Id. at 2572.
22 See notes 36-39, 45-48, 55-60, 68-71, 79-81, 90-95 iufra
and accompanying text.
2
23 42 U S.C. § 000e-9(c) (1970).
24 See id. § 2000e-9 (Supp. V 1975).
25 Id.
26 438 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1971).
27 Id. at 34. The charge contained four general accusations of discrimination:

(1) Negroes are discriminated against in promotion policies; (2) Negroes are
harassed, placed in fear of job loss, and subjected to different conditions than
white employees; (3) concession stands, locker and toilet facilities are segregated on the basis of race; (4) Negroes are hired for traditionally Negro jobs.
Id. at 34 (footnote omitted).
28 Id. at 37.
29 I. at 35.

30 h.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9(c) (1970).
31438 F.2d at 35.
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allege specific acts 32 and found that "the information sought [was]
highly relevant and material to [the] charge." 3 3 Although the court
noted that while "it may be appropriate to require" that charges
based on specific acts of discrimination state those acts, most laymen
cannot allege with specificity general, long-term employer discrimination. 34 It was the EEOC's investigatory function, the court stated, to
develop the specific facts to support the charge and uncover the in35
formation upon which a complaint could be based.
Furthermore, the court rejected the contention that the statutory
language authorizing an investigation was to be read to limit the
scope of the investigation. 3 6 It was stated that the statutory language
merely required the filing of a charge before an investigation was
begun. 37 Thereupon, the properly filed charge was the " 'matter . . .
under investigation,' " in support of which the EEOC could have access to any relevant information.3 8 The court granted enforcement of
the information requested by the EEOC since specific data concerning general company policies would be relevant to substantiate the
39
discrimination alleged in the charge.
Id. at 37-39.
33Id. at 41.
34 Id. at 38.
35 Id. at 38-39. To require the aggrieved party to state all incidents of discriminatory behavior with specificity would be equivalent to a requirement that an individual
establish a prima facie case at the time the charge is filed--"a plain distortion of the
roles prescribed by Congress for the charging party and the EEOC." Id. at 38.
36
Id. at 39-42.
37 Id. at 41.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 41-42. The Graniteville court quoted from Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC,
418 F.2d 355, 358 (6th Cir. 1969): " 'We consider an employer's "pattern of action"
relevant to the Commission's determination of whether there is reasonable cause to
believe that the employer has practiced racial discrimination.' " 438 F.2d at 42.
In Blue Bell Boots, the Sixth Circuit held that the employer was required to give
the EEOC access to the information sought despite the fact that much of the information did not specifically pertain to any of the black employees who had filed charges
alleging racial discrimination. 418 F.2d at 358. Blue Bell Boots had refused to comply
with the request for information because it felt that the scope of the investigation was
too broad. See id. Blue Bell Boots contested the investigation by bringing an action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9(c) (1970) to set aside the EEOC's demand for evidence.
418 F.2d at 356. The court reasoned that "racial discrimination is by definition class
discrimination." Id. at 358 (relying upon Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., I Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 354 (E.D. Ark. 1968)). The court held that the EEOC could "provide
relief [extending] beyond the limited interests of the charging parties" for the benefit of
the public. 418 F.2d at 358. Thus, the EEOC was justified in making a demand for
evidence of a broader scope than that pertaining directly to the charging parties. See id.
The holdings of Graniteville and Blue Bell Boots coincide with the decisions of two
other circuits. See Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 32-33 (5th Cir. 1968);
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 428 (8th Cir. 1970).
32
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The Fifth Circuit opinion in Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC40 demonstrates how charges of racial or sexual discrimination may be used
to expand the scope of an EEOC investigation by defining what is
relevant to such a charge. There, the court held that because these
two types of discrimination are by nature class discrimination, the
investigation need not be limited to facts solely relevant to the grievance of the charging party. 4 1 In Georgia Power, a charge had been
filed with the EEOC alleging racial and sexual discrimination in employment policies. 42 Pursuant to that charge, a demand was made
requesting access to the charging party's records and the records of
employees of the two departments where the charging party had
sought employment. 43 Georgia Power filed a petition in federal dis44
trict court to set aside the demand.
The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's enforcement of the
EEOC's demand for evidence against the contention that the EEOC
investigation should be limited to information regarding the rejection
of the charging party's application and records concerning the person
who was hired instead.4 5 The court agreed that such information was
indeed relevant, and added that because an allegation of racial or sexual discrimination amounts to an allegation of class discrimination,
information concerning two individuals is not enough to determine
reasonable cause to sustain the contentions of the charge. 46 The court
stated that "[lt]o limit the investigation to a single position would in
many, if not most instances severely restrict comparative study of the
charged party's hiring practices." 4 7 Therefore, facts relating to indi40412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969).
41 Id.

at 468.
at 464.
43Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 295 F. Supp. 950, 951-52 (N.D. Ga. 1968). The
materials requested included the names of all current employees in the Customer Service and Data Processing Departments, and a breakdown of those employees by race and
sex. Id. More detailed information was requested, such as test scores concerning employees hired around the time the charging party was denied employment. Id. at 952.
Any additional information that might be related was also sought. Id. The district court
modified the demand, by limiting it geographically to the employment policies of the
Atlanta office, temporally "to a five year period prior to the alleged violation," allowing
the demand to encompass only "nonsupervisory personnel in those two departments."
Id. at 953-54. Although the statutory limitations on the production of evidence are only
that it be relevant or material; the court imposed an additional requirement that the
request be reasonable. Id. The court, however, failed to set forth the standards by which
reasonableness was to be tested.
44 Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 295 F. Supp. 950, 951; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9(c)
(1970).
45412 F.2d at 467-68.
46 See id. at 468.
47Id.
42 Id.
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viduals other than the charging party were relevant to a determina8
tion of the charge.a
Relevance, however, is not the sole criterion by which the scope
of an investigation is examined. For example, the Seventh Circuit has
taken an approach based on the charging party's burden of proof. In
Motorola, Inc. v. McLain, 4 9 two separate charges had been filed with
the EEOC, each alleging racial discrimination. 50 Motorola was served
with a demand for evidence relating to the two charges. 5 1 In its demand, not only did the EEOC seek records pertaining to the individual charging parties, but it also requested complete records of all
hourly and salaried employees for the purpose of discovering any pattern of discrimination.5 2 The company refused to comply with the
demand, and petitioned the district court for a determination of the
permissible scope of the investigation. 5 3 The district court held that
54
Motorola need not comply with the demand.
Reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit held that the
EEOC's demand for evidence should be enforced because a plaintiff
in a Title VII action has the burden of proving that the employer's
justifications for alleged discrimination are merely pretextual. 5 5 The
4

See id.
49 484 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
50 484 F.2d at 1340-41.
51Id. at 1341; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1970).

See 484 F.2d at 1341-42.
Id. at 1341; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9(c) (1970).
5 484 F.2d at 1341-42.
55 Id. at 1345-46.
The Seventh Circuit used the burden-of-proof/pretextuality concept, developed in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to define the scope of an
EEOC investigation. See 484 F.2d at 1344-46. In McDonnell Douglas, the Court stated
that in order to demonstrate a prima facie case of racial discrimination in hiring practices an aggrieved party must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for
a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications.
411 U.S. at 802 (footnote omitted). Green, the plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas, was "a
long-time activist in the civil rights movement" who had been discharged as a result of
lay-offs at the plant. Id. at 794. Convinced that the lay-offs were racially motivated,
Green took part in an illegal demonstration protesting McDonnell Douglas' supposed
racially discriminatory activities. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 318 F. Supp. 846,
849-50 (E.D. Mo. 1970). Three weeks after the protest, the plant advertised that it was
hiring those of Green's trade. Id. at 849. Green applied for re-employment, and although qualified, he was rejected because of his participation in the illegal protest. Id.
Alleging violations of Title VII by McDonnell Douglas in the form of refusal to rehire
and unlawful racial bias, he brought a civil suit against the corporation. Id. at 849-50.
52

53
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court noted that "[ilnasmuch as evidence is admissible to establish
pretextuality, the investigatory powers of [the] EEOC to determine
whether reasonable cause exists to believe a violation of Title VII has
occurred, obviously extend at least as far."5 6 Thus, an EEOC demand
for materials is not overly broad where evidence of pretext for discriminatory policies is sought. 57 The court felt this result followed
from the congressional mandate that all forms of illegal employment
discrimination be abolished.5 8 An investigation limited to the records
of the charging party alone would leave patterns of illegal discriminatory practices uncovered and uncorrected. 59 The position taken by
the Motorola court may be summarized as follows: when seeking to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, an employer will not be

allowed to withhold evidence from an EEOC investigation that would
tend to demonstrate that its justifications for the alleged discrimina60
tory practices are mere pretext.
61
Since the 1972 amendments to Title VII have been in effect,
few appellate decisions have delineated the scope of an EEOC investigation triggered by a charge of discrimination. An examination of

these cases discloses that despite changes in the language of the law,
interpretation of the scope of the investigation has not altered ap62
preciably.
The district court dismissed the complaint, 318 F. Supp. at 851, and the Eighth Circuit
reversed. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 341, 343-44 (8th Cir.
1973). Maintaining that the issue was one directly affected by the burden of proof in a
Title VII action, the Supreme Court held that once the complainant has met the fourpart test to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the employer must
demonstrate "some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for" his seeming discriminatory behavior. 411 U.S. at 802. The employer's justifications are rebuttable; an aggrieved
party "must . ..be afforded a fair opportunity to show" that an employer's reasons for
certain practices are "in fact pretext." Id. at 804. As part of the evidence to rebut the
employer's case, the complainant could look to an employer's "general policy and practice with respect to minority employment." Id. at 804-05 (footnote omitted).
56 484 F.2d at 1345. The court analogized to Judge Swygert's construction of section
11 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1970), in NLRB v. Rohlen, 385
F.2d 52, 57 (7th Cir. 1967), that " 'if the material subpoenaed touches a matter under
investigation, it is within the scope of section 11(2) even though the material may not
be considered "evidence" as the term is employed in the courtroom.' " 484 F.2d at
1345. The opinion also pointed out that the EEOC has broad powers of investigation
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-8(a), -9(a) (1970) comparable to those of the NLRB. 484 F.2d at
1343-46; see note 21 supra.
57 484 F.2d at 1345.
5 11d. at 1344.

59See id. at 1345.
60 See id. at 1344-45.
61 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-1 7 (Supp. V 1975)).
62 There are, as there were prior to 1972, two sections of Title VII describing inves-
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The first case to deal definitively with the scope of an EEOC
investigation after the 1972 amendments was the district court decision in EEOC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 6 3 This was an action
brought by the EEOC based upon charges alleging racial employment discrimination at one particular plant. 64 The investigation, however, uncovered similar discrimination being practiced at another location, and this was included in the civil action brought against
DuPont. 65 DuPont contended, inter alia, that the scope of the civil
action was too broad in that it included allegations beyond those
raised in the charge. 6 6 Resolution of this issue necessitated the court's
examination of the scope of the investigation resulting from the
charge.

67

Although recognizing that the EEOC does not have unfettered

discretion in conducting investigations, the court found that the statutes granted it broad investigatory powers. 6 8 It concluded that the
investigation of an EEOC charge should be "reasonable" 69-one
which seeks the "root source of discrimination." 70 Thus, since the
investigation revealed that discriminatory practices at one location
were rooted in the practices of the personnel office at another location, this investigation was found to be a reasonable measure to
71
search for the existence of racial discrimination.

tigations undertaken by the EEOC. Section 2000e-8(a) was unchanged. See note 19
supra. Section 2 000e-9 was, however, completely rewritten. The text of this section as it
was originally passed in 1964 was based on 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1970), which defined the
scope of the investigatory powers of the National Labor Relations Board. See note 21
supra. The 1972 amendments to Title VII incorporated the language of 29 U.S.C. § 161:
"For the purpose of all hearings and investigations conducted by the Commission or its
duly authorized agents or agencies, section 161 of Title 29 shall apply." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-9 (Supp. V 1975).
c3373 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Del. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 516 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir.
1975).
64 373 F. Supp. at 1322, 1335.
95Id. at 1323, 1335-36.
66Id. at 1332-33.
67See id. at 1334-35. Since the court found that a complaint could allege anything
uncovered as a result of a proper investigation, see id. at 1335-36, it had to determine
whether the investigation was in fact proper before the validity vel non of the complaint
could be resolved. See id. at 1334-35; note 111 infra and accompanying text.
68
See id. at 1334-36; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1970), reprinted in note 19 supra; 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (Supp. V 1975), reprinted in note 62 supra.
69 373 F. Supp. at 1335. Such a conclusion is drawn from the text of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-8(a) (1970), reprinted in note 19 supra. See 373 F. Supp. at 1335.
70 373 F. Supp. at 1336.
71id. at 1335-36. The reasoning utilized in Sanchez v. Standard Brands, 431 F.2d
455 (5th Cir. 1971), was applied by the DuPont court. 373 F. Supp. at 1335. Sanchez
had held, in part, that the charges of discrimination were not to be literally construed to
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The Eighth Circuit has also taken the position that charges are to
be liberally construed for the purpose of determining the scope of an
investigation. In EEOC v. Western Publishing Co., 72 the court held
that the EEOC should be allowed to investigate incidents occurring
after the original charge was filed. 73 In Western, a black woman had
filed charges against her former employer alleging racial discrimination as manifested in unfavorable employment references that she
had been given. 74 The charge filed was later amended to incorporate
not only the original charge, but also additional allegations that her
former employer had engaged in and was continuing to engage in racially discriminatory treatment of its employees. 75 The EEOC served
on Western a subpoena duces tecum which demanded materials and
records covering all phases of "the company's employment practice
and policies"; Western refused to comply. 76 In an action brought to
enforce the demand, 77 the district court quashed the subpoena, holding that the scope of the investigation extended only to what was relevant to the original charge of discriminatory references, namely, the
78
records of terminated employees.
The court of appeals reversed, stressing that prior cases had established the proposition that charges filed before the EEOC are to
be read "broadly." 79 Therefore, the charge filed was not limited
merely to the corporate policy concerning references, but was read to
include general charges of past and ongoing racially discriminatory
practices. 80 Since a permissible investigation may encompass all that
is "relevant and material" to the charge, the circuit court directed the

defeat the complaint. 431 F.2d at 462-64. The DuPont court indicated that the burden
was on the EEOC, and not upon the aggrieved party, to investigate and uncover the
cause of the discrimination. 373 F. Supp. at 1335. Adopting the statement in Blue Bell
Boots, Inc. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 1971), that all forms of discrimination are
class discrimination, and supplying the observation that aggrieved parties rarely recognize patterns of discrimination, the court reasoned that the investigation should proceed
limited only by what reasonably " 'grow[s] out of' that charge." Id. (quoting from
Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 466). For a more complete discussion of Sanchez, see notes 97-112
infra and accompanying text.
72 502 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1974).
73See id. at 603.
74Id. at 600-01.
75Id. at 601.
76 Id. at 602. Western disputed the relevance of the information sought as compared
with the specifics of the charge filed.
77 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (Supp. V 1975).
78See EEOC v. Western Publishing Co., 374 F. Supp. 1165, 1166 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
79502 F.2d at 603-04.
80 Id. at 603.
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trial court on remand to redetermine what was relevant to the
charge, including an investigation of ongoing discrimination. 8 '

The most expansive interpretation of the permissible scope of an
investigation is found in EEOC v. University of New Mexico. 8 2 There,
the Tenth Circuit sanctioned what would formerly have been branded
as a " 'fishing expeditio[n].' -83 In that case, the charge was that the
university had retaliated against a professor who was of slavic origin
by discharging him for filing a complaint with the state commission

on human rights. 8 4 The EEOC initiated an investigation and received, in response to its request, materials from the university specifically concerning the aggrieved party as well as lists of all discharges
occurring at the college of engineering. 85 Subsequently, in order to
more thoroughly investigate the complainant's allegations, the EEOC
subpoenaed the "'personnel files of those faculty members terminated from the College of Engineering.' "86 The university refused to
produce the documents and the EEOC petitioned the district court
to require compliance with the subpoena. 87 The district court so
ordered, 88 and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 89
Although the court of appeals recognized that administrative
agencies do not have the statutory authority to engage in " 'fishing
expeditions,' "90 it indicated that Title VII provides the EEOC with
more sweeping investigatory powers than those accorded other
agencies. 9 ' In the court's analysis, the fact that the statute prescribes
8 Id. A related issue has appeared in a recent decision of note. In EEOC v. Western
Elec. Co., 382 F. Supp. 787 (D. Md. 1974), Western Electric argued that the EEOC had
exceeded its statutory authority and had violated its own rules by serving Western
Electric with compulsory interrogatories during the investigation. Id. at 793. The court
agreed with Western Electric, holding that the only method of compelling testimony
or evidence from an employer is through the use of a subpoena enforced by court order.
Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2 000e-9 (Supp. V 1975). The court found that no internal rules of
the EEOC permitted the use of compulsory interrogatories. 382 F. Supp. at 794. Stressing the fact that conciliation was still emphasized under 1972 amendments, the court
felt that the use of compulsory interrogatories would "minimize communication" between the parties, thus defeating Title VI's policy of promoting conciliation. Id.
82 504 F.2d 1296, 1296 (10th Cir. 1974), aff'g EEOC v. University of New Mexico, 7
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 653 (D.N.M. 1973).
83

504 F.2d at 1303.

84

Id. at 1299.

85

Id.

86 ld.
87 ld.
88 Id. at 1300.
89 Id. at 1306.
90

Id. at 1302 (relying upon Cudahy Packing Co. v. NLRB, 117 F.2d 692, 694 (10th
Cir. 1941)).
91 504 F.2d at 1302.
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the standards for the evaluation of an investigation as anything "that
relates to unlawful employment practices . . . and is relevant to the
charge ''92 rendered meaningless the issue of whether the investigation amounted to a fishing expedition. 9 3 Basing its conclusion in part
on an expansive reading of Title VII and in part on two Supreme
Court cases dealing with agency investigations, 94 the Tenth Circuit
took the position that if the investigation is "for a lawfully authorized
purpose," then the demand for evidence will be deemed valid. 9 5
Ultimately, the determining factor in any examination of an
EEOC investigation is the statutory concept of relevance. The courts
are in agreement that there must be some palpable relationship between the charge and the scope of the investigation. EEOC investigations have been validated despite their broad scope where they have
searched for the root cause of the charge of discrimination, where
evidence is sought to establish the pretextuality of an employer's defense, and where the information sought is material to a charge of
class discrimination.
Prior to the 1972 amendments to Title \11,96 the leading case
defining the relationship between the complaint and the investigation
97
was the Fifth Circuit decision in Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc.
Celia Sanchez filed a sex discrimination charge with the EEOC which
alleged that she had been struck by her supervisor.9 8 At the time
Sanchez filed her charge, Title \1 1 required that to maintain an action, an aggrieved party was required to file a charge within ninety
days of the last discriminatory act. 9 9 Sanchez complied with this pro92

Id.

(quoting from 42 U.S.C. § 200 0 e-8(a) (1970)) (emphasis by court).

9'See 504 F.2d at 1302-03.
9"Id. The court cited United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), dealing with an
IRS investigation, and United States v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 632 (1950), which involved an FTC investigation.
9 The university had raised another issue. It claimed that the subpoena was capricious and arbitrary, asserting that the EEOC already had as much intormation as
needed to make a reasonable cause determination. Id. at 1305. The court struck down
this argument by introducing the theory of evidential pretextuality which holds that an
aggrieved party, may be entitled to as much information as would tend to destroy an employer's defenses (pretext) for alleged discriminatory behavior because the aggrieved
party bears the burden of proving illegal discrimination. Id. at 1305-06; see MlcDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-07 (1973); Motorola, Inc. v. McLain, 484
F.2d 1339, 1344-46 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
96 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. V 1975).
97431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970).
98 Id. at 458. On the EEOC charge form, Sanchez merely checked the box marked
'sex' " as to type of discrimination after declaring the reasons for filing the charge. Id.
99 As originally enacted, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1970) provided in pertinent part:
A charge . . . shall he filed within ninety days after the alleged unlawful
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vision insofar as her sex discrimination charge was concerned. However, after the ninety day period had run from the last discriminatory
act, she amended her charge, based upon the same facts, to include
00
discrimination based on national origin.'
An investigation by the EEOC ensued which established reasonemployment practice occurred, except that in the case of an unlawful employment practice [where the aggrieved party has first exhausted his state remedy],
such charge shall be filed by the person aggrieved within two hundred and ten
days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred ....
As amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. V 1975), has increased the period of timely
filing to 180 and 300 days respectively. Compliance with this provision is a jurisdictional prerequisite. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975).
A case illustrative of the broad interpretation of the filing requirement is Macklin
v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Feeling that he had
suffered from illegal employment discrimination, Macklin filed a charge with the
EEOC. See id. at 984. The EEOC took action after the state agency deferral period had
expired. Id. Thus 210 days was apparently the maximum amount of time Macklin could
be accorded in which to file a charge after the last discriminatory act had occurred. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1970). In Macklin's case, however, approximately two years had
passed since the last act of discrimination. See 478 F.2d at 986-87. The court interpreted
Macklin's charge, which alleged a policy of racially discriminatory hiring practices
throughout the two year period, as demonstrating continuing acts of racial discrimination. Id. at 987-88. Thus, the court held the charge to have been timely filed. Id. at
987-88; accord, Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1188 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); see Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 46 F.R.D. 442, 444
(N.D. Ga. 1968) (where continuing discrimination is alleged, the charge need not be
filed "within a specified time"). See also Austin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F. Supp.
1145, 1152 (E.D. Va. 1970); Tippett v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 316 F. Supp. 292,
296 (M.D.N.C. 1970); Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310 F. Supp. 891, 896-97 (D. Me.
1970). But cf. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 557-60 (1977) (employer
held not to commit a continuing violation of Title VII by not crediting employee with
prior seniority upon reinstatement, even though she lost seniority by illegal discriminatory acts).
One circuit has implied that the timeliness of the filing of a charge cannot be successfully challenged at trial where the EEOC has assumed jurisdiction unless the employer can show that there is no rational foundation for the EEOC's action. Boudreaux v.
Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011, 1014 n.6 (5th Cir. 1971). Other
circuits have approached the issue on a case-by-case basis without regard to the
EEOC's assumption of jurisdiction. E.g., Richard v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 469 F.2d
1249, 1251-52 (8th Cir. 1972) (210-day limit tolled where claimant submitted charge to
EEOC which forwarded it to state agency).
Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 200 0 e-5(c) (Supp. V 1975), provides that no charge may be
filed with the EEOC until "sixty days after the [state] proceedings have been commenced." This language has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972), as allowing the EEOC, after the filing of an informal
charge by the aggrieved party, to refer that charge on behalf of the complainant to a state
agency performing a function comparable to that of the EEOC. Id. at 525. Furthermore,
the Court held that following a final determination of the matter by the state agency, the
EEOC was empowered to act for the individual and could formally refile the original
charge. Id. at 526; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. V 1975).
100See 431 F.2d at 458-59.
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able cause to show discrimination based upon national origin alone. 10 1
After an unproductive attempt at conciliation, Sanchez brought a civil
action against her employer in which she alleged unlawful discrimination based on national origin. 10 2 The district court granted, in part,
a motion by Standard Brands to dismiss the complaint because the
allegations contained therein had not been timely filed with the

EEOC. 103
On appeal by Sanchez, Standard Brands took the position that
she could bring an action limited only to the allegations contained in
her original charge.' 0 4 In the alternative, the company contended
that the factual allegations contained in her civil complaint exceeded
those included in the original and the amended charges, thus render1 °5
ing the action outside the comprehension of Title VII.
The court rejected Standard Brands' position on appeal, finding
it to be a highly technical reading of the statute and untenable in light
of both Title VII's " 'remedial and humanitarian underpinnings . . .
and of the crucial role played by the litigant in the statutory
scheme.' "106 The court noted that as a result of its statutory purpose,
"procedural ambiguities in the statutory framework [were to be]
resolved .

.

. in favor of the complaining party.'

10 7

In rejecting the first contention made by Standard Brands, the
Fifth Circuit found that procedural errors made by a charging party
(such as checking the wrong box as to the type of discrimination on
the charging form) should neither bar nor limit'a resulting civil
action.' 08 The court likewise rejected the alternative argument made
101

Id.

2 Id. at 459-60.
1031d. at 460. The district court, however, did give Sanchez leave to file an
amended complaint limited to the allegations contained in the original charge. Id.
104 Id. at 461.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 460.
107

Id. at 460-62.

108 Id. at 462-64. The Sanchez court outlined three reasons for so holding: (1) the
charging party may have knowledge of the facts, but may be ignorant of the motive; (2)
the charging party may be able to articulate his feelings as to unfair treatment, but
unable to denominate the type of discrimination suffered; and (3) the charging party
may simply not know how to use forms. Id. at 462-63. The court emphasized "that the
provisions of Title VII were not designed for the sophisticated or the cognoscenti," but
were aimed at ameliorating the employment opportunities of all workers, even those of
limited intelligence or learning. Id. at 463; see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 44 (1974); Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 526-27; Wetzel v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 202-03 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
Decisions prior to Sanchez had held that non-compliance with other types of pro-
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by Standard Brands, stating that the words of the complaint need not
precisely match the words of the charge. 109 Instead, the scope of an
action brought by the charging party can be expanded by evidence
uncovered during the "investigation which can reasonably be expected to [have] grow[n] out of the charge of discrimination.' 10 It is
therefore the investigation, according to the Sanchez court, that determines the scope of a civil action."' The court reversed and remanded the action to the district court which was ordered to hear the
12
case on its merits."
cedural technicalities did not bar Title VII relief. For example, class actions may be
maintained even if only' one member of a class files a charge with the EEOC. See,
e.g., Miller v,.International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283, 284-85 (5th Cir. 1969); Oatis v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 1968). Also, verification that a
charge has been filed "under oath" could be made after the passing of the ninety-day
period under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a), (d) (1970). See, e.g., Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC,
418 F.2d 355, 357 (6th Cir. 1969); Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462, 466 (5th
Cir. 1969); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 231 (5th Cir. 1969);
Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357, 359 (7th Cir. 1968).
109 431 F.2d at 464-67. Basic to the court's rejection of the contention that the
Sanchez complaint was broader than the charge, was the principle that procedural technicalities should not bar the application of Title VII remedies. Id. at 464-65. The court
stated that common law principles of pleading were not to apply, otherwise, Title VII
would be rendered meaningless. Id. at 465.
110Id. at 466. The thrust of the rule set forth in the Sanchez decision is that the
purpose of a charge is merely to set the administrative machinery in action, i.e., "to
trigger the investigatory and conciliatory procedures of the EEOC." Id.
"I Id. The court stated that limiting the scope of the complaint to the allegations in
the charge would hinder the congressional intent underlying Title VII, which was to
encourage conciliation wherever possible. Id. Absent the Sanchez holding, the EEOC's
attempt at conciliation would be futile since the employer would know that the subject
of litigation could include only those issues raised in the charge.
Similar reasoning was used by the Sixth Circuit in Tipler v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971). In that case, an issue presented was
whether a complaint could contain a count not specified in the charge. Id. at 127. Tipler
was a black laborer who had actively participated in the ouster of his white foreman. Id.
Tipler was subsequently discharged for what duPont claimed were non-discriminatory
reasons. Id. He filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that the "discharge was racially
motivated," that there was job discrimination against blacks both in terms of working
conditions and promotion policies, and that the discharge was punitive in nature. Id.
Following an investigation by the EEOC, Tipler brought suit alleging that he had been
discharged for the reasons contained in the charge and for his activist position in attempting to broaden opportunities for blacks. Id. DuPont contended that Tipler could
not raise the issue since it was not contained in the charge. Id. at 131. The Sixth Circuit
held the scope of the complaint to be proper. Id. The court took the position that the
true content of the charge was to be established by information obtained during the
investigation and that the complaint was merely a "more detailed and refined" statement of what was being charged.
In Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the
District of Columbia Circuit implied that it would adhere to the Sanchez rationale. See
id. at 988. For a discussion of Spector, see note 99 supra.
112 431 F.2d at 467.
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In Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp.,113 the Ninth
Circuit took a slightly different approach to the complaint-investigation relationship so as to include events not in the original charge.
Oubichon filed a charge with the EEOC alleging racial discrimination
following his disciplinary suspension for participating in a civil rights
demonstration against North American.' 1 4 The charge was immediately referred to the California agency which handled complaints
of unfair employment practices. 115 Oubichon's charge was rejected by
the state agency and the EEOC took formal jurisdiction of the
charge. 116 At that time, Oubichon filed three additional charges of discriminatorv em ployment practices against North American which were
not submitted to the California agency."7 Conciliation on the charges
was unsuccessful and Oubichon brought suit on all four charges.118
North American moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction that part
of the complaint which had not been subjected to state examination;
the district court granted the motion.119
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.1 20 It noted that prior
decisions had held that judicial relief is not limited to the words of
the original charge: "the complaint . . . may encompass any discrimi-

nation like or reasonably related to the . . . charge, including new

The Sanchez court cited King v. Georgia Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ga.
1968), for the proposition that the civil action should be limited to those areas which
could have been " 'the subject matter of ... conciliation efforts between [the] EEOC
and the employer.' " 431 F.2d at 467 (quoting from 295 F. Supp. at 947).
In King, the original charges were investigated and a reasonable cause detennination was made that discrimination existed. 295 F. Supp. at 945. Georgia Power contended that the action should have been dismissed as the complaint did not precisely
conform to the charges filed with the EEOC. Id. The district court held that although a
complaint in a Title VII action is predicated on the standing of a private party to bring
suit, the complaint could contain - 'any such discrimination like or reasonably related to
the allegations of the charge and growing out of such allegations during the pendency of
the case before the Commission,' " Id. at 947 (footnote omitted).
In Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1971), the Fifth Circuit
took a slightly different approach to the scope of a complaint. The court cited King v.
Georgia Power as authority for the rule governing the scope of a complaint. Id. at 162.
The King rule, however, was altered in Danner to the extent that it eliminated King's
reference to the scope of the complaint as including allegations developed during the
administrative procedures undertaken by the EEOC. id. at 162.
113 482 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1973).
114 Id.
at 570.
115 Id.
1u6 id.; see Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1972).
n7 482 F.2d at 570.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 570-71.
120 Id.
at 571, 575.
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acts occurring during the pendency of the charge before the
EEOC."''
This approach was held to be equally applicable when a
charge is originally submitted to a state agency.' 2 2 The court indicated, however, that litigation of later filed charges may take place
along with litigation based on the initial charge only if the later
charges are "related to or grow out of"'2 3 the initial charge. 124 By
allowing the inclusions of the three additional charges in the complaint, the Ninth Circuit has gone one step further than Sanchez. The
complaint may encompass not only the charge as expanded by the
investigation, but also may include later charges not referred to a state
agency where those charges are reasonably related to a charge ini25
tially referred to a state employment practices agency.'
The Fifth Circuit, in Gamble v. Birmingham Southern Railroad,126
faced with a failure by the EEOC to fully investigate a charge, modified its Sanchez rule rather than force the aggrieved parties to refile
27
a charge nine years after the original charge had been brought.'
Specifically, the charging parties stated that they had not been permitted to qualify for a promotion to conductor. 128 After two years of
investigation and attempted conciliation, the right-to-sue notice was
given to the charging parties.' 2 9 The complaint, however, was drawn
to include racial discrimination in promotions to supervisor, a factual
allegation not investigated by the EEOC,' 3 0 The court indicated that
Sanchez would not aid in a determination of the propriety of the
scope of the complaint precisely because there was a limited
investigation.'13 Rather than dismissing the action, the Fifth Circuit
modified Sanchez, holding that no reference need be made to the
EEOC investigation where the-complaint contains allegations " 'like
or related to' " the charge originally filed. 132 In this case, the court
121Id. at 571. The court also stated that "a needless procedural barrier" would be
presented, if the aggrieved party were to be forced to file an additional charge every
time a new discriminatory event occurred. Id.; cf. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522,
526-27 (strict adherence to procedural requirements of Title VII are antithetical to its
purposes).
122 482 F.2d at 571.
123Id.
124 See id. The court indicated that a determination of the relationship between the
original and later charges could be made at trial and remanded the action. Id.
125

Id.

126

514 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1975).
id. at 680, 687-89.

127 See

128
129

Id. at 687.

Id. at 680.
130Id. at 687-88.
113,
2 Id.
3 Id.at 688-89.
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found the charge "that 'I was not allowed to promote to conductor'
implicitly includes the complaint that 'I was not allowed to promote
to supervisor' since supervisors are chosen from the ranks of conductor." 133 The court noted that a diligent investigation of the original charge logically would have led to evidence of discrimination in
4
promotions to supervisory positions.13
The court stated two reasons for modifying Sanchez. First, it
noted that such a modification was consistent with the Sanchez
court's policy of interpreting procedural technicalities in favor of private litigants.' 35 The court also indicated that it would be unfair to
133 Id. at 687-88.
The Seventh Circuit, however, in Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538
F.2d 164 (7th Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986 (1976), concluded that a charge
can be interpreted to sustain a complaint without making reference to the investigation,
citing Gamble for support. See 538 F.2d at 168-69. The plaintiff filed a charge with the
EEOC stating she had been denied a promotion because she wore "an Afro hairstyle."
Id. at 167. After receiving a right-to-sue notice, Jenkins brought suit seeking certification to maintain a class action as a representative of those denied promotion because of
unlawful discrimination on the basis of " 'race, sex, [andl black styles of hair and
dress.' " Id. at 165. The district court refused to permit Jenkins to file a class action
since she had not alleged sex discrimination in the EEOC charge and because her allegations of discrimination on account of hair style were not enough to maintain an
action based on race. Id. The Seventh Circuit found that some of the language in her
original charge evidenced an intent to include allegations of sex discrimination. Id.
at 169. The charge stated that Jenkins' supervisor had " 'accused [her] of being a leader
of the girls' "-white and black alike. Id. This was enough of an allegation of sex discrimination in the charge to warrant the inclusion of sex discrimination in the complaint. Id. The court also reasoned that Jenkins should not be penalized for not complying with the procedural technicality of checking "sex" as a type of discrimination she
was alleging. Id.; see Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 462-64; Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511
F.2d 199, 202 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 424 U.S. 737
(1976).
134 514 F.2d at 687-88. The railroad had contended that it had a right to conciliate
on the issue of promotion to supervisor. Id. at 688. The court paid little attention to this
argument as it had previously recognized that conciliation was not a condition precedent to a private civil action under Title VII. Id.; see Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
447 F.2d 159, 161 (5th Cir. 1971); Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283,
288-91 (5th Cir. 1969); Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir.
1969); cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973) (holding that
the filing of a charge and the receipt of a right-to-sue notice are the only conditions
precedent to a private Title VII action). It seems that the railroad's argument in Gamble
was actually one of clue process, that it had not been notified or accorded the opportunity of preparing for this cause of action. Cf. EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359,
368-71 (4th Cir. 1976) (GE argued a violation of due process in that the EEOC had not
notified it of a charge of sex discrimination).
135 514 F.2d at 688-89; see Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d at 463; Tipler
v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 131 (6th Cir. 1971); Graniteville Co. v.
EEOC, 438 F.2d 32, 38-39 (4th Cir. 1971); Willis v. Chicago Extruded Metals Co., 375
F. Supp. 362, 365 (N.D. I11.
1974).
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force the aggrieved parties to file a new charge almost ten years after
the original charge had been brought.136
Thus, in those courts which have decided the issue of the permissible scope of a private action brought pursuant to Title VII, there
has been a tendency to look beyond the factual allegations in the
original charge to sustain the judicial complaint. Where an individual
faces a dismissal of his action because of allegations not explicitly covered in the charge, the circuits have emphasized that the investigation is useful to set the boundaries of the permissible scope of the
private action. In the alternative, the complaint may be based on
anything like or reasonably related to the charge.
Regardless of the propriety of the investigation and the scope of
the action for relief, there often remain issues of justiciability. Indi13 7
viduals bringing suit must have standing to obtain a remedy.
Courts have uniformly held that it is the aggrieved party, as defined
by Title VII, who has standing to sue.138 In class actions, issues of
136 514 F.2d at 689; cf. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 526 (1972) (statement by
Court that "[t]o require a second 'filing' by the aggrieved party after termination of state
proceedings would serve no purpose other than the creation of an additional procedural
technicality").
The Third Circuit recently adopted the Sanchez approach as modified by Gamble.
In Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1041 (1977), a union local filed an EEOC charge against Johnson, alleging sex
discrimination in one department. 541 F.2d at 399. While this charge was being investigated, Ostapowicz filed two additional charges alleging sex discrimination in a different
department. Id. The conciliation arising out of the investigation of the first charge was
unsuccessful. Id. at 397. Ostapowicz was given a right-to-sue notice after the unsuccessful conciliation of the first charge. Id. at 399. Johnson claimed that Ostapowicz was not
an aggrieved party since her department was not the subject of the original charge. Id.
at 398. The court held otherwise, finding that those additional charges filed by Ostapowicz explicated the original union-filed charge, allowing her to bring an action
broader in scope than the original charge. Id. at 399. The court cited as its basis for
holding in favor of the private litigant the Gamble, Sanchez, and Oubichon cases. Id.
137 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-501 (1975); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN,
D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 156-57 (2d ed. 1973 & 1977 Supp. 36-37).
138 In Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971), it was contended
that only "employees" have standing to sue under Title VII by reason of section
2000e(f) (1970). 445 F.2d at 445. Those private parties who may bring an action are defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975), which provides in pertinent part that
if the Commission
notif[ies] the person aggrieved [,then] within ninety days after the giving of
such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the
charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge was
filed by a member of the Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges
was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment practice.
In Hackett, the above provision was held to be illustrative of "a congressional intention
to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution." 445
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justiciability, particularly mootness, have been decided in favor of
the litigant by looking to the basic policies underlying Title VII.
F.2d at 446. Hackett had worked for a laundry for thirty years as the only black delivery
driver until he was discharged solely for racial reasons. See id. at 444. Hackett filed a
charge with the EEOC which resulted in his bringing a class action seeking reinstatement to his former position with its attendant privileges, money damages, and an injunction against future discriminatory behavior. Id. At some point prior to commencing
suit, Hackett applied for and received a pension. Id. at 445. The district court dismissed
the suit, finding that Hackett lacked standing to sue under Title VII because, as a pensioner he was not an employee as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1970). 445 F.2d at
445. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that it was not the definitional section of the
Act which prescribed requirements for standing but rather the remedies section, 42
U.S.C. § 2 000e-5(e) (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975)).
445 F.2d at 445-47. The court said that Hackett had standing, since by his allegations
of discriminatory employment practices, he was a party "claiming to be aggrieved"
under section 2000e-5(e). 445 F.2d at 445-47. Such a requirement was the only statutory prerequisite for standing under Title VII. Id. at 447. Speaking for the panel, Judge
Gibbons discussed the ramifications of the opinion:
The national public policy reflected .. .in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 . ..may not be frustrated by the development of overly technical judicial doctrines of standing or election of remedies. If the plaintiff is sufficiently
aggrieved so that he claims enough injury in fact to present a genuine case or
controversy in the Article III sense, then he should have standing to sue in his
own right and as a class representative.
Id. at 446-47. This determination was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
The Sixth Circuit, in Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th
Cir. 1971), was presented with a similar standing issue. DuPont alleged that Tipler
lacked standing to challenge internal company policies since he was no longer an employee. Id. at 130. The court held that Tipler had standing for two reasons. First, since
all Title VII actions are in the nature of class actions, there was controversy between
DuPont and those still employed, id. (citing Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d
28, 33 (5th Cir. 1968)); therefore, Tipler had standing to maintain his action for the benefit of remaining employees. 443 F.2d at 130. The court also indicated that there was no
need to resolve one cause of action and then force the charging parties to bring another
suit to remedy the general discriminatory policies remaining at the plant. See id. at 130;
Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (laid-off
employee an aggrieved party within the meaning of Title VII).
An interesting approach to Title VII standing was taken by the District of Columbia
Circuit in Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Gray was a
black bus driver employed by Greyhound. Id. at 173. He brought a Title VII action on
behalf of himself and a class of persons similarly situated, alleging among other things,
racial discrimination in the hiring of bus drivers. See id. at 172-73. Greyhound successfully moved for summary judgment arguing that since Gray had been hired as a bus
driver he lacked standing for himself and the class he claimed to represent. Id. at
173-74.
The District of Columbia Circuit reversed. Id. at 177. The court said that there
were "two aspects" of standing: constitutional and statutory. Id. at 175. It was incumbent upon Greyhound to show that Gray lacked standing as a result of either or both
aspects. See id. at 175-76. The first aspect of standing was viewed as article III standing, stated to be an " 'injury in fact,' " id. at 175 (quoting from Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970)), or more specifically,
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CLASS ACTION SUITS BROUGHT BY
PRIVATE LITIGANTS

There is no provision in Title VII, either as originally enacted, or

as amended, which specifically provides for class actions.' 3 9 Originally, there were only two forms of civil actions prescribed by Title VII.
First, an aggrieved person was permitted to bring an action against

the party named in the charge filed with the EEOC. 140 In such an
action, the Attorney General was permitted to intervene if he certified "the case [to be] of general public importance.' 14 1 Second, the
Attorney General was empowered to bypass the administrative processes of the EEOC "[w]henever [there was] reasonable cause to believe that [there was] a pattern or practice" of Title VII violations and
he was permitted to file a complaint in federal district court against
those "responsible. "142
Despite the textual prescription for but two forms of suits under
Title VII, it is now clear that class actions are consistent with its
statutory objectives. 143 This determination was first reached in Oatis

v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,144 which was decided under the 1964
Act. Although the EEOA of 1972 does not specifically provide for

class actions either, the legislative history of that Act demonstrates
145
that Congress is favorably disposed to such actions.
In Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., Hill, a black employee had
filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging racial discrimination in the
department in which he worked. 14 6 The necessary procedural steps
."'an injury . . . that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision,'" 545 F.2d at 175
(quoting from Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)). Furthermore, such an injury need not be economic or physical, for an intangible injury is
recognized by constitutional concepts of standing. 545 F.2d at 175. The plaintiff was
held to have article III standing on the basis of psychological injury due to racial isolation. Id. The second aspect required, as stated by Association of Data Processing, 397
U.S. at 153, that plaintiff's interest be "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute" upon which his claim is based. 545 F.2d at 175.
Title VII was deemed by the court to "gran[t] [standing] to anyone who satisfies the
constitutional requirements." Id. at 176 (relying upon Hackett, 445 F.2d at 446). Thus,
summary judgment for Greyhound should not have been granted because the plaintiff
had standing arising from disputes concerning intangible injuries suffered by him. 545
F.2d at 176.
139See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2 0 0 0 e to 2000e-1 7 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
140Id. § 2000e-5(e) (1970).
141 Id.
14 Id. § 2000e-6(a) (1970).
14' See text accompanying note 152 infra.
1' 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
145118 CONG. REC. 7565 (1972).
I" See 398 F.2d at 497, 499.
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were completed by the EEOC and the charging party was given his
right-to-sue notice.14 7 The charging party, however, chose to bring a
class action as the representative of those in his department. 14 8 Hill
was joined by Oatis and two other coplaintiffs, who had not filed
charges with the EEOC, as class representatives of other departments of Crown Zellerbach. 149 The company moved to dismiss, contending that class actions were not permitted by Title VII and that
those who have not filed a charge with the EEOC may not join an
action instituted by one who had filed. 150 The district court permitted
the suit to continue as a class action but limited its members to those
who had filed charges with the EEOC.' 5 1
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that class actions were necessary to the proper operation of Title VII and should be allowed, provided that the action met the requirements of rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' 5 2 The court determined that
the district court's decision imposed unduly narrow restrictions on
the operation of Title VII. 153 Judge Griffin Bell reasoned that it was
contrary to congressional intent to force every member of a class to
file a charge with the EEOC in order to reap any of the benefits of
Title V1I.14 Thus, as long as the class representative has standing to
147 See id. at 497.

148 Id. at 497, 499.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 497. In particular, Crown Zellerbach contended that by virtue of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-6(a) (1970), the Attorney General was to be the complainant in suits that otherwise might be class actions. 398 F.2d at 498.
151 398 F.2d at 497.
152 Id. at 499. The federal rules provide that

(a) Prerequisites to a class action.
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3)
the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class actions maintainable.
An Action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief
or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole ....
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
15 398 F.2d at 498.

154 Id. at 498-99. The court cited the decision in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), as being analogous. 398 F.2d at 499. Newmam, however, involved litigation of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which deals with
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raise the issues, has filed a charge with the EEOC, and has complied
with rule 23, there is no bar to class actions. 15 5 In response to the
issue of whether the coplaintiffs who had not filed charges had standing to sue, the court held that it was not necessary that each individual file a charge with the EEOC, provided that all were members
of a class asserting the same or similar issues to those raised by the
charging party. 156 Therefore, each coplaintiff in Oatis was held to
have standing to sue as a representative of the class of workers in his
department. 157
discrimination at places of public accommodation. 390 U.S. at 400; see 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1970). In Newman, the Supreme Court recognized the class nature
of any Title II action since private litigants are vindicating essentially public rights.
390 U.S. at 401-02.
155 398 F.2d at 499. Other circuits have cited with approval or have followed Oatis'
determination that class actions are within the scope of permissible Title VII actions.
E.g., Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 520 (6th Cir. 1976); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 246, 250 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975);
EEOC v. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitters Local
189, 438 F.2d 408, 412 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 832 (1971); see, e.g., Hackley v.
Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108, 152 n.177 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Barela v. United Nuclear Corp.,
462 F.2d 149, 155 (10th Cir. 1972); Local 179, United Textile Workers v. Federal Paper
Stock Co., 461 F.2d 849, 851 (8th Cir. 1972); Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F.2d
889, 893 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972).
156 398 F.2d at 499.
157

Id.

The Seventh Circuit adopted the reasoning of Oatis in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive
Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969), finding that racial and sexual discrimination were by
their very nature class discrimination. Id. at 719-21. The court said that whenever a
"'plant-wide" system of discrimination is uncovered, courts must be "available to all
those members of the injured class who may be entitled to relief," not just to those who
filed charges with the EEOC. Id. at 721. Therefore, the only standing issue was the
representative capacity of those joining the charging party in the class action. Id. at
719-21.
The Supreme Court has stated that the remedies of Title VII "may be awarded on a
class basis . . . without exhaustion of administrative procedures by the unnamed class
members." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975); see Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 771 (1976); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d
1333, 1333 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979,
985 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1973). See generally Gay v. Waiters' Union Local No. 32, 549 F.2d
1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 1977). The Supreme Court has held that where a district court
denies class action status to a charging party's action and that party does not appeal the
denial of class determination after final judgment, a member of the class may intervene
to appeal the class status. United Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 391-96

(1977).
A decision which runs counter to those cases which have upheld the standing of a
plaintiff to represent those who have not filed charges is Belcher v. Bassett Furniture
Indus., Inc., 376 F. Supp. 593 (W.D. Va. 1974). There, the court held that a class action
could not be maintained because none of the named plaintiffs had filed a charge of sex
discrimination with the EEOC. Id. at 597. Only charges alleging race discrimination
had been filed. Id. The court stated that the jurisdictional prerequisites of an investiga-
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Because class actions are inherent in the proper operation of
Title VII, courts have permitted them to proceed despite the mootness of the class representative's claim, or where the aggrieved party
seeks to represent a class of which he is only potentially a member.
In Jenkins v. United Gas Corp.,'58 the Fifth Circuit was faced with
the issue of whether a plaintiff had standing to sue when he apparently was no longer personally aggrieved vis-4-vis the original charge
filed with the EEOC. 1 59 Jenkins was a black male who was working
as a serviceman's helper and was passed over for a pronotion to serviceman in favor of a white man who was allegedly less qualified than
Jenkins for the job. 160 Jenkins filed a charge with the EEOC alleging
that this act was an example of racial discrimination.16 1 The charge
was fully investigated and a reasonable cause determination was made
in Jenkins' favor. 16 2 After the necessary administrative steps had been
completed, Jenkins filed a class action suit alleging, among other
things, a policy of discrimination on the part of United Gas against
blacks who sought promotions to the position of serviceman. 163
United Gas offered Jenkins a promotion to this position, which he accepted, and United Gas moved to dismiss the action, contending that
the case was moot. 164 The district court agreed that the action was
5
moot and dismissed the complaint.16
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the
complaint, reasoning that a Title VII action is much "more than a
private claim by the employee" ;166 rather, it "is perforce a sort of
class action for fellow employees similarly situated. "167 The court
held that in such cases a private litigant takes upon himself "the mantel [sic] of the sovereign" and becomes a " 'private Attorney
General.' "16 As a result, the court found that a dismissal of the action and notice to the employer had not been met; therefore, the plaintiff had no standing to sue to remedy sex discriminhation. Id.

This analysis is somewhat confusing as

neither investigation nor notice is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a private Title VII
action. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973).
158 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968).
19 See id.at 29-30.
160 Id. at 30.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
at 31. Jenkins also sought an injunction to prohibit this policy and any other
discriminatory policies of United Gas. Id.
165

Id.
166 Id. at 32.
167 Id. at 33.
168 Id. at 32-33.
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tion without inquiry into the broadly based allegations of discrimination was not justified. 169 The United Gas court stated that dismissal
was not warranted absent vindication of the public interest. 170 The
court also noted that the action was not moot as to Jenkins himself
since the issue of back pay was unresolved. 17 1 Equally as important
to the Fifth Circuit panel was the consideration that if it held the
action moot, such a result would tend to encourage continued discrimination by employers. 1 72 An employer, by settling individual
claims out of court, could continue to practice its discriminatory
policies against other employees. 1 73 Thus, the action in Jenkins was
permitted to continue on this basis.
The ploy of "out of court settlement" was also attempted in
Parhan v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.174 Parham, a black male,
applied for a lineman's position and passed various aptitude and physical tests given by the company.1 75 Nevertheless, Parham was denied
employment on the basis of his poor past employment record as well
as low standing in his high school class. 1 76 Parham filed a charge with
the EEOC, alleging that the telephone company practiced unlawful
hiring policies. 1 77 Reasonable cause was found to believe the charge
to be true and the EEOC attempted conciliation. 1 78 Thereafter, the
telephone company offered the lineman's position to Parham who refused to accept since he was enrolled in college at the time the offer
was made. 17 9 Further conciliation efforts based on the charge were
fruitless as the company considered the controversy moot because of
Parham's refusal to accept the proffered position. 180 Parham then
brought a class action alleging racial discrimination in the company's
hiring practices. 18 1 The district court dismissed the suit, rejecting
82
Parham's petition for remuneration and injunctive relief.'
169 Id. at 33-34.
170

171

Id.

Id.

172 Id.

Id. at 33-34.
433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
175 Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 1 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 354, 355 (E.D.
Ark. 1968).
176 433 F.2d at 423.
177 Id.
178 Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 1 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 354, 355 (E.D.
Ark. 1968).
"73
174

179 433 F.2d at 423.

180 Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 1 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 354, 355 (E.D.
Ark. 1968).
181

Id.

182 433 F.2d at 422.
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The Eighth Circuit, however, found that there had been a past
policy of racial discrimination in employment practices.' l 3 It agreed
with the telephone company that there had been good reason not to
hire Parham. 184 Nevertheless, it adopted the reasoning of' United
Gas that any Title VII suit is by nature a class action, and held that
neither the offer of the lineman's position nor the fortuity of a negative determination of discrimination in the plaintiff's own situation
should result in the dismissal of the class suit.1 85 Standing was therefore found to be predicated on something much broader than a personal stake in the outcome, since Parham was allowed to represent a
class of aggrieved persons who were otherwise remediless, even
18 6
though he himself was no longer aggrieved.
183 Id. at 426. This past discrimination was shown by the low number of black employees. Id.
184 Id. at 428. The court held that the mere fact that the telephone company had
practiced discrimination in hiring practices does not create a conclusive presumption
that any black denied employment has been treated unfairly. Id. Rather, all evidence
must be examined to determine the good faith of the company in such a situation. Id.
185 See id.; Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 524-25 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976).
The Supreme Court has held that discharge of the aggrieved party subsequent to
assumption of jurisdiction by the EEOC does not render the case moot. In Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), plaintiff Lee intervened on behalf of himself
and all others who were, or had applied to be, over-the-road drivers alleging racial
discrimination in hiring and discharge policies. Id. at 750-51. Before the Supreme
Court, Bowman contended that Lee's action had become moot since Bowman had hired
Lee during the pendency of the EEOC investigation and then had discharged him for
cause. Id. at 752-53 & n.4. The Court was not impressed with Bowman's contention that
since Lee no longer had a stake in the outcome, the action was moot. The Court noted
"that the fact the named plaintiff no longer has a personal stake in the outcome of a
certified class action [does not render] the class action moot in the absence of an issue
'capable of repetition, yet evading review.' " Id. at 753-55. The Court cited three circuit
court opinions that could be analogized to this approach: Roberts v. Union Co., 487
F.2d 387 (6th Cir. 1973); Moss v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1973); and Brown v.
Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982
(1972). 424 U.S. at 754 n.7. In Franiks, the Court found that upon the facts presented,
Lee had made out a case or controversy within the meaning of article III of the Constitution since a controversy remained, that of back pay and seniority for all members of
the class to which plaintiff Lee belonged. 424 U.S. at 755-77; see Sosna v. Iowa, 419
U.S. 393, 398, 402 (1975); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204 (1962).
In Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973), standing was
raised as an issue because the aggrieved party had resigned after suit had been instituted. 477 F.2d at 94. While still an employee, Rosen had filed a charge with tie
EEOC, challenging the pension plans of the utility company as being sexually discriminatory. Id. at 92-94. Relying on Hackett and United Gas, the Third Circuit held
that because Rosen "was subject to the discriminatory . . . pension plans," he was suffi-

ciently aggrieved to have standing to sue. Id.
186 See 433 F.2d at 428. The case was remanded to the district court to insure
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While contentions of mootness have often been resolved to permit the continuance of a class action, standing to represent a class
also has been liberally evaluated. In Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc.,187
the plaintiff was found to have standing to represent a class of which
he was only potentially a member.188 In Carr, the plaintiffs were
black job applicants who had filed charges with the EEOC alleging
that Conoco practiced racially discriminatory hiring practices. 18 9 After
Southwestern Bell's "continued implementation of . . . equal employment opportunities." Id. at 429-30.
The Parhan rationale was used by the Fourth Circuit in Brown v. Gaston County
Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1383 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972).
Brown involved a class action to remedy racial discrimination in which the failure of
proof of the class representative's charge, rather than the mootniess of that charge, put
the continued maintenance of the class action at issue. Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing
Mach. Co., 325 F. Supp. 541, 543 (W.D.N.C. 1970). Citing Parham as on point, the
Fourth Circuit upheld the continuance of the suit as a class action. 457 F.2d at 1380.
The case was remanded to the district court after the circuit court examined the facts on
their merits and determined that the company had exercised and was still exercising
various policies of racial discrimination. See id. at 1383.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed its position in Moss v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d 853 (4th Cir.
1973). In Moss, the plaintiff was found to lack standing as to himself, but was permitted
to continue a class action on behalf of a class of which plaintiff had thought himself a
member. Id. at 855. The court stated the rule to be:
If the plaintiff were a member of the class at the commencement of the action
and his competency as a representative of the class then determined or assumed, the subsequent dismissal or mootness of his individual claim, particularly in a discrimination case, will not operate as a dismissal or render moot the
action of the class, or destroy the plaintiff's right to litigate the issues on behalf
of the class.
Id.; see Barnett v. W. T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 546-48 (4th Cir. 1975) (failure of proof
as to plaintiff does not require dismissal of the class action); Gibson v. Local 40, Supercargoes and Checkers, 543 F.2d 1259, 1263 (9th Cir. 1976) ("failure of proof as to the
named plaintiffs would not bar . . . class action").
A Sixth Circuit decision can be used to clarify the proposition set forth in Moss. In
Heard v. Mueller Co., 464 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1972), the court found no evidence of
racial discrimination against either the plaintiff or anyone else. Id. at 193. Heard attempted to amend his complaint in order to maintain a class action. Id. at 193-94. The
circuit court upheld a denial of permission to proceed as a class action, as the facts
showed that Heard was not a member of the class he claimed to represent. Id. Heard
was no longer an employee of Mueller and was no longer a member of the union local.
Id. at 194. The court stated that where an individual has no prospect of returning to his
former employment position and where there are no areas of adversity between the
parties, that it would be " 'sanction[ing] a "sham" class action.' " 464 F.2d at 194. It
would seem that active employment, or a prospect of returning to work would be
enough to maintain the class action. See Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511,
520 n.15 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976).
187 423 F.2d 57 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 951 (1970). The district court opinion is reprinted in full beginning at page 59 and also may be found in 295 F. Supp. 1281
(N.D. Miss. 1969).
188 423 F.2d at 65.
189 Id. at 59.

19771

COMMENTS

the requisite procedural steps had been taken by the EEOC, each
plaintiff was given the right to sue. 190 A class action was brought,
seeking relief not only from discrimination in hiring but also as to
racially discriminatory facilities and practices within the plant. 19'
Conoco moved to dismiss certain counts of the complaint, contending
that the representatives were not members of the classes they were
claiming to represent, i.e., employees.' 92 The court held that those
who have been denied employment because of racially discriminatory
hiring practices may "seek to enjoin other unlawful employment practices committed by the same employer, if those practices, although
not directly injurious to them at the time of their application for employment, potentially affect them because of their race."' 1 93 The court
took the position that it would have been "foolhardy to say that once
plaintiffs have removed racially discriminatory practices at the door,
they are required to start anew in order to remove those that exist on
the inside."' 194 The precise basis for the holding in Carr is obscure, as
95
the reasoning partakes of elements of both ripeness and standing.1
Although the court discusses potential harm to the plaintiff, the cases
upon which it relies are couched in the terms of standing.' 9 6 The
practical effect of the decision is to give plaintiffs the ability to assert
97
the right of a class of which they are not a member. 1
190 Id.
191 Id. at 62 & n.8.
192 Id. at 62.
193Id. at 65.

194Id. The court said: "Such a practice would result in a multiplicity of suits and a
waste of time and money for all interested parties." Id.
195 See id. at 65-66; 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3531, at 230-31 (1975). It has been suggested that theories of ripeness and standing may be combined without "resting decision distinctly on" either. Id.
This may explain the lack of distinction in the Carr opinion.
196423 F.2d at 65. The court relied upon Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1967) (class comprised of doctors and
potential hospital patients properly joined to remedy staff and admissions discrimination
since both classes were interdependent); Singleton v. Board of Comm. of State Inst.,
356 F.2d 771, 773-74 (5th Cir. 1966) (class action to remedy reform school discrimination not moot despite plaintiffs' release where there was a possibility of return to reform
school); Anderson v. City of Albany, 321 F.2d 649, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1963) (class action to
remedy municipal policy of segregation upheld against contention that plaintiffs were
not members of the class of those discriminated against; personal injury in the form of
arrest not required for standing as there was an " 'immediate, and real interest' " in the
ending of discrimination); Rackley v. Board of Trustees of Orangeburg Regional Hosp.,
310 F.2d 141, 142-43 (4th Cir. 1962) (suggestion that suit to end discrimination in hospital should be brought as a class action seeking a permanent injunction to end all discrimination rather than on a room-by-room basis despite fact that plaintiffs had been
subjected to discrimination in one room only). 423 F.2d at 65-66.
197 See 423 F.2d at 65-66.
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Apparently then, one's employment status at the time charges
are filed and suit is brought need not be the single, controlling factor
in determining a party's standing to bring in an EEOC action under
Title VII.1 9 8 Events affecting standing which occur after an aggrieved
party has filed a charge do not affect the ability of that party to maintain his own action if there remains adversity between himself and the
respondent. Likewise, such events do not affect the ability of the
charging party to maintain a class action if there exists adversity between the class and the respondent. Furthermore, even if the plaintiff is not an employee at the time charges are filed, courts have held
that there is no bar to an action as long as some form of adversity exists between the parties. In general, courts have been reluctant to
hold that a plaintiff lacks standing on either technical or procedural
grounds.
The scope of private Title VII litigation cannot be summarized in
the abstract. A thorough understanding of case law is mandatory. The
central theme which is common to all the cases is the intent to effectuate the underlying purpose of Title VII. A further key principle is
the idea that the relief obtained often transcends the damage to the
aggrieved party. This means that private litigation is not beyond the
confines of Title VII merely because it may benefit others in addition
to the plaintiff.
THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF AN

EEOC

ACTION

On March 8, 1972, Congress passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964.199 The
overall purpose of the 1972 Act was the same as that of the 1964 Act,
198 Of course, standing to sue as a class representative must be established. See
Nance v. Union Carbide Corp., 540 F.2d 718, 722-23 (4th Cir. 1976) (statement that
"the plaintiff in such an action, in order to establish the right to proceed as a class
representative, 'must [like any other plaintiff] establish that the action meets the requirements of Rule 23(a)' "), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 953 (1977).
The Seventh Circuit has held that a union may maintain an action under Title VII.
Local 194, Retail, Wholesale and Dep't Store Union v. Standard Brands, Inc., 540 F.2d
864, 865-66 (7th Cir. 1976); see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). The Seventh
Circuit also stated that a union need not bring such an action as a class action. 540 F.2d
at 867.
For further discussions on standing, see Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 DUKE L.J.
573, 597-608; Note, The Tentative Settlement Class and Class Action Suits Under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1462 (1974).
i99 Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(Supp. V 1975)).
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namely, to bring an end to employment discrimination. 20 0 The most
significant reason for its passage, however, was Congress' intent to
remedy the failure of the voluntary compliance approach to Title VII
charges. 2 0 l This recognition resulted in Congress' conferring enforcement powers upon the EEOC.2 0 2 Under the 1972 amendments,
the EEOC was given the power to bring a civil action in federal district court against a disciminatory employer in which the private,
aggrieved party would be permitted to join.2 0 3 Although the Supreme Court has not delineated the conditions precedent to an
EEOC remedial action, several circuits have been confronted with
this precise question. It is apparent from an examination of the cases
that there is a wide disparity of views as to what does constitute the
20 4
conditions precedent.
200 H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2141.
201 Id. at 3-5, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2139-41. In its
report, the House specifically recognized the failure of voluntary compliance with the
law to effectively end discrimination of all types in the United States. Id. at 3, reprinted
in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2139. Statistics cited showed an increase,
rather than a decrease, in charges filed with the EEOC and that conciliation failed in
more than half of those charges where reasonable cause had been found. Id. at 3-4,
reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2139-40. The House admitted that
"the machinery created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not adequate." Id. at 3, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2139.
202 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a), (f) (Supp. V 1975). 42 U.S.C. § 2300e-5(f) provides in
pertinent part:
(1) If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or
within thirty days after expiration of any period of reference under subsection
(c) or (d) of this section [which sections provide for referral to state authorities
before EEOC action], the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge.
The remarks of Congressman Dent show the primary purpose of the amendments to
the 1964 Act: "The key to the whole legislation is the enforcement powers granted to
the Commission, the ability to go into the Federal district courts to enforce compliance
with the act." 118 CONG. REG. 7563, 7569 (1972). Congressman Dent was one of the
House managers on the conference committee which put the bill into final form. See
118 CONG. REc. 6646 (1972). See also Branch & Hunter, Equal Employment Opportunities: Administrative Procedures and Judicial Developments Under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 18 How.
L.J. 543, 547 (1975).
203 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. V 1975).
204 Some courts have come to the conclusion
that the provisions of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975) constitute conditions precedent which must be complied
with before the EEOC may bring an action. E.g., EEOC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
505 F.2d 610, 617 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975); see EEOC v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 373 F. Supp. 1321, 1333-34 (D. Del. 1974), aff'd on other
grounds, 516 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975). These cases have held that 42 U.S.C.
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The scope of a complaint in a civil action filed by the EEOC
cannot be discussed without contemporaneously attending to the
issue of standing. In the 1972 amendments, Congress neglected to
specify on whose behalf the EEOC would be deemed to be suing if
conciliation failed or did not take place. 20 5 An argument can be made
that the EEOC sues not only on behalf of the aggrieved private
party, but also on behalf of society; 20 6 therefore, it should be permited to bring suit without being forced to meet stringent standing
§ 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975) creates five conditions precedent to the maintenance of a
civil suit by the EEOC: proper filing of a charge, notice of charge given to employer,
investigation of charge, finding of reasonable cause to believe charge to be true, and
attempted conciliation. See id. Several courts have held, however, while not finding five
conditions precedent, that an attempt at conciliation is a condition precedent to the
maintenance of an EEOC civil action. E.g., EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d
1352, 1355 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975); EEOC v. United States Pipe &
Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237, 247 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
The language of § 2000e-5(f), that provision which allows filing of an action, however, does not literally require that conciliation be attempted or that any condition precedent be complied with before suit is filed. It merely provides for suit if a conciliation
agreement has not been secured: "If ... the Commission has been unable to secure
from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent .... Id.
Note that this does not conflict with the determination that there are but two jurisdictional prerequisites in a private civil action brought under Title VII. McDonnell
Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973).
Conditions precedent are not the same as jurisdictional prerequisites. Branch &
Hunter, supra note 202, at 565 & n.141, 566-68. Jurisdictional prerequisites must be
pleaded since parties may not confer jurisdiction upon a federal court. Conditions precedent, however, are related to due process concepts of fairness. Thus, where a condition precedent is not met, the degree of unfairness to the employer may determine
whether or not the action will be dismissed. EEOC v. Airguide Corp., 539 F.2d 1038,
1042 (5th Cir. 1976) (potential unfairness where employer received no notice that
charge had been filed); EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 367-73 (4th Cir.
1976) (upon facts of case, no unfairness despite lack of notice to employer of finding
probable cause of a type of discrimination not charged); EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,
511 F.2d 1352, 1360 (6th Cir.) (failure of Commission to notify employer of termination
of conciliation not prejudicial under facts of case), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975); see
Report of Conference Committee of the House and Senate of February 29, 1972, 118
CONG. REC. 7564 (1972) (congressional intention "that failure to give notice of the
charge to the respondent within ten days would [not] prejudice the rights of the aggrieved party"). See also Branch & Hunter, supra note 202, at 565 & n.141, 566-68.
Although the EEOC is apparently required to follow the same procedural steps before
the filing of either a private or EEOC action, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b),(f)(1) (Supp. V
1975), it may be more equitable in light of the suffering of the private party to forego
certain procedural steps.
205 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975), reprinted in note 202 supra.
206 The conference committee, which reported to Congress on the final language of
the 1972 amendments, declared that all claims "under Title VII involve the vindication
of a major public interest, and that any action under the Act involves considerations
beyond those raised by the individual claimant." 118 CONG. REC. 7565 (1972).
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requirements. 20 7 An alternative position is that the rights of the aggrieved party are "paramount"; and therefore, the EEOC is limited,
in a civil suit brought pursuant to an individual charge, to those is208
sues on which the private party had standing to sue.
There are two types of cases in which issues have arisen concerning the scope of the complaint; both involve the standing of the
EEOC vis-4-vis the private party on whose behalf the investigation
was begun. The first category consists of EEOC cases where the
standing of the private charging party to sue in his own right is highly
questionable or is actually nonexistent. The second type consists of
EEOC cases where the complaint encompasses factual allegations
beyond what was originally charged or beyond those subjects about
which the charging party had standing to charge. Litigation of these
latter issues has been minimal, but of enormous practical importance
to the EEOC.
When presented with an EEOC suit arising out of a charge

brought by a private party, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have upheld
the right of the agency to continue the action despite a change in the
status of the private individual which renders his grievance moot. For
example, in EEOC v. Huttig Sash & Door Co.,

20 9

the charging party

claimed that his employer had discriminated against him on a racial
basis in its hiring practices and had maintained racially segregated
facilities. 2 10 After conducting its investigation, 2 11 the EEOC was un-

able to find reasonable cause to believe that Huttig had discriminated against the charging party, nor could it find reasonable cause to

207

id.

2 8

id. In the Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 1746, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, the Conference Committee of the House and Senate, on February 29, 1972, stated that "the individual's rights to redress are paramount under the
provisions of Title VII." 118 CONG. REc. 7565 (1972). Thus, if the individual's rights are
"paramount," the primary purpose of the suit must be to aid the charging individual.
It
is therefore tenable to conclude that the EEOC be limited in its suits solely to those
issues on which the private aggrieved party had standing to sue. This is similar to the
position recently taken by the Tenth Circuit in EEOC v. Continental Oil Co., 548 F.2d
884 (10th Cir. 1977). There, the court seemed to indicate that actions brought pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) were on behalf of the public interest
whereas those brought pursuant to § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. V 1975) were on behalf of private
individuals. 548 F.2d at 887. In a situation where the private aggrieved party had already brought an action, the Tenth Circuit thus held that the EEOC was not permitted
to bring its own action under § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975). 548 F.2d at 889-90.
209511 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'g EEOC v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 371 F.
Supp. 848 (S.D. Ala. 1974).
0 See

210 511 F.2d at 454.

211 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), -8(a), -9 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); notes 19, 62 supra.
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believe that Huttig maintained racially discriminatory facilities. 21 2
The EEOC did find, however, that there was reasonable cause to believe that Huttig maintained racially and sexually discriminatory job
classifications. 2 13 Conciliation efforts as to these violations failed, and
the charging party brought an action against Huttig.2 14 For reasons
not given, the private party moved to dismiss the action, which was
granted by the district court.2 1 5 Subsequently, the EEOC brought a
separate action against Huttig alleging racial discrimination.2 16 On
Huttig's motion, the district court dismissed the EEOC suit reasoning that since the private action had been dismissed, "there was no

longer an outstanding charge on which the complaint could be
predicated. "217
Resolution of the issue by the Fifth Circuit required that a balance be struck between conflicting policies: Huttig's contention that
duplicitous proceedings should be avoided, and the EEOC's reply
that Title VII should not be hampered by a narrow construction of
the procedural aspects of the statute. 2 18 The court found that the
EEOC action was not duplicitous since it was much broader in scope
than the individual private action. 2 1 9 Using language nearly identical
to that found in Sanchez, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that an investigation often reveals evidence of discrimination extending far beyond the
scope of the particular charge. 22 0 Thus, there was no compelling
212 511 F.2d at 454.

213 Id. The EEOC also found that Huttig had placed employment advertisements
which were sexually discriminatory. Id.
214 See id.
215 Id.
216 Id.

217 Id.; see 371 F. Supp. at 851.
218 511 F.2d at 454.

219 Id. at 455. Huttig contended that EEOC v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 493 F.2d 71
(8th Cir. 1974), had decided the issue to the contrary as it had held that the EEOC was
limited to permissive intervention under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (Supp. V 1975) once the
private party had brought a prior action. 511 F.2d at 454. Huttig urged that since the
only option for the EEOC was permissive intervention, there was no remedy available
to the EEOC as the private action had been dismissed. Id.; see EEOC v. North Hills
Passavant Hosp., 544 F.2d 664, 672 (3d Cir. 1976); cf. EEOC v. Duval Corp., 528 F.2d
945, 947-49 (10th Cir. 1976) (after issuance of right-to-sue notice, private party and
EEOC have concurrent right to bring an action). The Ninth Circuit has indicated that if
presented with the issue of whether the EEOC may bring a separate action after the
institution of an individual action, it would hold that so long as a private civil action
under Title VII was still in existence the EEOC would, at most, be permitted to intervene. EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd on
other grounds, 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
22 Compare 511 F.2d at 455 with 431 F.2d at 466. In Huttig, the court said that
the EEOC uses the filing of a charge simply as a jurisdictional springboard to
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reason to limit the EEOC to permissive intervention in a private ac-

tion where the investigation has uncovered violations of Title VII ex22 1
tending beyond those affecting the private party and his action.
Thus, in the context of an EEOC action which follows the dismissal
of a private suit, the scope of the complaint may include as much as
the scope of the investigation allows, i.e., that which is reasonably
22 2
related to the charge.
2 23
The Sixth Circuit held, in EEOC v. McLean Trucking Co.,
that neither the charging party's acceptance of an arbitration award
nor the settlement of a separate action prior to the institution of an
EEOC suit barred an action wider in scope than the original
charge. 2 2 4 The facts indicate that Brown, a short-haul truck driver,

investigate whether the employer is engaged in any discriminatory practices;
this investigation might frequently disclose, as in this instance, illegal practices
other than those listed in the charge.
511 F.2d at 455.
221 511 F.2d at 455. In addition, the court stated that to bar the EEOC from bringing
suit following the dismissal of a private action would encourage employers to attempt
settlement with the private party, thus preventing the achievement of the overall purpose of Title VII-the eradication of illegal employment practices. Id. (relying on
Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968)). As a caveat, the court added
that the EEOC action that may be brought following the dismissal of a private action
must concern discrimination other than "that particular charge and on behalf of that
person who had had his suit adjudicated." 511 F.2d at 456.
222 The result in Huttig is consistent with the intent of the conference committee
that private litigation "be the exception and not the rule." 118 CONG. REC. 7565 (1972).
The Huttig analysis has been explicitly rejected by the Tenth Circuit. EEOC v.
Continental Oil Co., 548 F.2d 884, 889-90 (10th Cir. 1977). The Tenth Circuit came to
this conclusion because there is no reference in the statute to the EEOC's right to sue
merely because the scope of its complaint is broader than that of a previously filed
private action. Id. It also reasoned that the language in 42 U.S.C. § 2 000e-5(f)(l) (Supp.
V 1975), reprinted in note 202 supra, regarding permissive intervention by the EEOC
would be rendered meaningless if the EEOC were allowed to maintain a separate suit,
since it felt that the provisions therein described the exclusive manner in which the
EEOC could participate in a previously filed law suit. 548 F.2d at 889-90. The Tenth
Circuit questioned the purpose of the permissive intervention language ifit were not
to be applied in situations similar to the Huttig case or where there was a currently

pending private action. Id. The Tenth Circuit also rejected and criticized contrary
decisions of the Sixth and Third Circuits. Compare 511 F.2d 453 with EEOC v.McLean
Trucking Co., 525 F.2d 1007, 1010-11 (6th Cir. 1975) (acceptance of arbitration award
by charging party did not deprive EEOC of standing to bring suit to eliminate discrimination in the "public interest"); EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1363
(6th Cir.) (acceptance of private settlement agreement did not preclude EEOC from
bringing action), cert. deoied, 423 U.S. 944 (1975); EEOC v. North Hills Passavant
Hosp., 544 F.2d 664, 672 (3d Cir. 1976) (dismissal of private claim did not bar EEOC
suit).
223 525 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1975).
224 Id. at 1010; cf. Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 29-30 (5th Cir. 1968)
(acceptance of private settlement by charging party-class representative after charge
was filed does not render class action moot).
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filed a charge with the EEOC in late 1970 alleging that McLean discriminated against its black drivers who applied for over-the-road
positions. 22 5 While the charge was being investigated by the EEOC,
several events occurred which caused a disagreement over its right to
bring an action. First, although the charging party was permitted to
attend a driving school which trained drivers for the over-the-road
jobs, he quit the school. 2 26 During the course of the investigation,
the charging party filed a grievance which was subject to arbitration
between McLean and Brown's union. 22 7 This resulted in an award
permitting him to complete the driving school. 228 Seven months after
the arbitration award, the EEOC issued a statement finding that
there was reasonable cause to believe that McLean had exercised discriminatory practices in not permitting black drivers to transfer to
over-the-road positions. 22 9 Later, Brown brought his own action
which was dismissed without prejudice following a compromise be2 30
tween himself and his employer.
Subsequent to this dismissal, the EEOC brought an action based
on the charge filed by the private party and alleged that McLean
engaged in racially discriminatory practices against its employees and
applicants. 2 3 1 This action was dismissed by the district court which
225
226
227

See 525 F.2d at 1008.

Id.
See id. at 1008-09.
at 1009.

228 Id.
229

See id.

230

Id.

231 Id.

The EEOC also named the union local, the regional Teamsters' conference
and the International as defendants. The district court held that no suit could be
brought against them since they were not named in the charge filed by the aggrieved
employee. Id. at 1009-10. The Sixth Circuit held otherwise, although it recognized that
the usual rule was that section 2000e-5(e) required the defendant to be named in the
charge. 525 F.2d at 1011-12; see, e.g., Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 181
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Thornton v. East Texas Motor Freight, 497 F.2d 416, 424 (6th Cir.
1974). It reasoned that the union was an indispensable party and should be joined
under the provisions of Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "for the purpose of interpreting the collective bargaining agreements." 525 F.2d at 1012 (relying
upon Reyes v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 53 F.R.D. 293, 297 (D. Kan. 1971); Torockio
v. Chamberlain Mfg. Co., 51 F.R.D. 517, 519 (W.D. Pa. 1970)). Thus, joinder was permitted as to the union defendants. 525 F.2d at 1012; see Held v. Missouri Pacific R.R.,
373 F. Supp. 996, 1000 (S.D. Tex. 1974); cf. Bremer v. St. Louis Sw. R.R., 310 F. Supp.
1333, 1339-40 (E.D. Mo. 1969) (plaintiff required to make union a defendant).
A related issue is whether the EEOC may bring a civil action against an employer
who succeeds the original discriminatory employer after the filing of the charge. The
Sixth Circuit was presented with this issue in EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers,
Inc., 503 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1974). Charges which were filed by an employee against
the Flintkote Company alleging race and sex discrimination were fully investigated,
resulting in a reasonable cause determination that there was discrimination violative of
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held, in part, that the charging party's acceptance of the arbitration
award and maintenance and dismissal of his own action precluded
2 32
any EEOC action based on that charge.
The Sixth Circuit held "that neither the acceptance of the arbitration award nor the filing or settlement of [the] separate action" by
the employee barred the EEOC from bringing its own suit.23 3 The
court, in reaching this conclusion, adopted the view that the
" 'EEOC sues to vindicate the public interest, which is broader than
the interests of the charging part[y].' -234 Thus, despite the prior institution and settlement of a private action, the EEOC was permitted
to maintain its action because its investigation of the charge had uncovered discrimination extending beyond the interests of the charging
party. 235 The acceptance of the grievance arbitration by the charging
party was held to be of minimal effect on EEOC litigation for the
same reasons. 23 6 The court noted, however, that the charging party
Title VII. Id. at 1088. Sometime after the EEOC had assumed jurisdiction over the
charge, MacMillan obtained control of Flintkote. Id. The EEOC sued MacMillan for
discriminatory employment practices, stating in its complaint that all conditions precedent had been met. Id. The circuit court reversed the dismissal of the action, holding
that it could be maintained only against the successor company for the acts of its predecessor where the successor has notice of the EEOC charge. Id. at 1090-91. More
specifically, the court indicated that to maintain an action against the successor company for acts of the predecessor, there must be a case-by-case analysis of three variables: (1) the degree of "[slubstantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise
before and after the change," (2) the continuation of discriminatory policies and (3)
receipt of notice in some manner by the successor company of the discrimination practiced by the predecessor. See id. at 1089-90. In part, this conclusion was drawn from
cases interpreting the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970). 503
F.2d at 1089-91. See generallyj Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive
Bd., Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249 (1974). According to the court, the
successor doctrine was applicable to Title VII since the Act was aimed at "eliminat[ing]
discrimination in employment" through the grant of "broad equitable powers" to the
courts. 503 F.2d at 1091. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that to disallow such an action
against a successor "could emasculate the relief provisons of Title VII." Id. Thus, the
court found it unnecessary to order a refiling of the same charge against MacMillan
since refiling would merely delay the proceedings. Id. at 1093. But cf. Young v. Kerr
Indus., Inc., 540 F.2d 755, 756 (4th Cir. 1976) (adding as party, employer's trustee in
bankruptcy disallowed in Title VII action).
232 525 F.2d at 1009.
233 Id. at 1010. The court relied on EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975), in reaching its conclusion. 525 F.2d at 1010.
In Kimberlyj-Clark, one of the issues concerned whether the EEOC could include in
its complaint certain discriminatory lay-offs that had been at issue in a private suit previously settled. 511 F.2d at 1361.
234
See 525 F.2d at 1010.
235
23 6

Id. & n.8.

See id.at 1010. The court cited Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
60 (1974) (footnote omitted), which held that a "federal court should consider the
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was bound by the arbitration award and could not sue for additional
benefits. 23 7 This did not mean, the court said, that the charging party
could be precluded from sharing generally in the benefits of an
EEOC action reaped by all of the employees of McLean. 23 8 Thus,
the EEOC may maintain its action nearly independent of the ac239
tivities of the charging party.
There are but a handful of cases in which a court has been compelled to decide the propriety of an EEOC action on principles of
standing. There have been no Supreme Court decisions on point.
Although early district court opinions deciding EEOC standing as
an issue of first impression have been somewhat conservative in their
approach, later district court opinions and most circuit opinions have
been of a liberal nature.
In the early case of EEOC v. Western Electric Co., 240 an employee filed a charge alleging racial discrimination in the company's
disciplinary actions. 2 4 1 Having apparently fulfilled all procedural prerequisites, the EEOC then brought suit against Western Electric
alleging that the company was discriminating against blacks and
women. 24 2 In response, Western Electric contended, inter alia, that
the "allegations of sex discrimination [were] not 'like or reasonably
243
related' to the charge.-

employee's claim de novo" and could accord the arbitral decision the evidential value it
"deems appropriate." 525 F.2d at 1010.
237 525 F.2d at 1010.
2 38
1d. at 1011.
239 Id. In addition to the other reasons given to permit the action, there were no
other pending suits in which the EEOC could seek permission to intervene. Id. Compare EEOC v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 511 F.2d 453, 455-56 (5th Cir. 1975) with EEOC
v. McLean Trucking Co., 525 F.2d 1007, 1010-12 (6th Cir. 1975).
240 382 F. Supp. 787 (D. Md. 1974).
241 Id. at 789. The charging party claimed to have been discharged for the same
prohibited conduct for which a white was merely given a ten-day suspension. Id.
242 Id. at 789.
243 Id. at 797. Western Electric also contended that it was not given adequate "opportunity to respond to the allegations of discrimination as required under Regulation
1601.14." 382 F. Supp. at 789. This claim was upheld by the court. Id. at 798-800.
The pertinent part of 29 C.F.R. § 1601.14 (1976) provides:
As a part of each investigation, the person making the charge on behalf of the
aggrieved person, the aggrieved person, and the respondent shall each be offered an opportunity to submit a statement of its position or evidence with respect to the allegations.
On this basis, the court concluded that it was violative of procedural safeguards not to
have given Western Electric a chance to explain its actions. 382 F. Supp. at 801. Western Electric had had no prior notice of those charges until after interrogatories submitted by the EEOC had been answered and those answers used to find probable cause.
See id. The court stated that the lack of notice to Western Electric would work against
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To resolve these issues, the court indicated that under the Sanchez formulation, it was compelled to determine whether sex discrimination was so related to racial discrimination as to be revealed by a
reasonable investigation of a sex discrimination charge.2 44 Western
Electric contended that since the charging party was a male, he had
no standing to raise sex discrimination and consequently neither had
the EEOC.2 45 The EEOC countered by stating "that the concept of
standing is irrelevant where a government agency files suit in the
public interest."2 4 6 The district court ruled in favor of Western Electric, holding that a charge could be expanded under Sanchez only to
the extent that the charging party had standing to raise issues in the
first place.24 7 Therefore, the court could not entertain the action
since a man could never claim harm because of sex discrimination
248
against women.
the theme of voluntary compliance underlying Title VII. Id. The court stated that this
was so despite the fact that there is a trial de novo which must take place to determine
the existence of Title VII violations. Id.; cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36, 51 (1974) (statement that there is "no prospective waiver of an employee's rights
under Title VII" due to trial de novo); Chandler v.Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 864 (1976)
(federal employees have same right to trial de novo as private sector employees). Unfairness resulted when the information Western Electric submitted was used to show
reasonable cause to believe other forms of discrimination existed; this had been done
without giving Western Electric an opportunity to explain before the reasonable cause
determination. 382 F. Supp. at 801.
In EEOC v. Airguide Corp., 539 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth Circuit attempted to state a general rule to be followed when the EEOC has not followed all of
the procedural steps. The facts indicate that Airguide did not receive actual notice of
the charge filed until nearly ten months later. Id. at 1040-41. Because of this failure to
meet a condition precedent, see note 204 supra, the district court granted summary
judgment for Airguide. 539 F.2d at 1041. The circuit court reversed, holding that since
the EEOC had attempted to give Airguide notice of the charge, there was good faith
shown; therefore, summary judgment would turn on the findings of prejudice suffered
by Airguide as a result of not receiving notice of the charge. Id. at 1040-41. The Fifth
Circuit stated the rule to be: "where there has been virtual compliance with all the
statutory procedural steps, and where there has been no clear showing of substantial
prejudice to" an employer, there is no procedural bar to suit. Id. at 1042; see EEOC v.
General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 370-71 (4th Cir. 1976) (same as to notice of charge);
EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1360 (6th Cir.) (judicial action not precluded by noncompliance with procedural rule where no prejudice to employer), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975).
244 382 F. Supp. at 797-98.
245

Id.

246

Id. at 799.

Id.; see EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 757, 761 (W.D. Va. 1974),
rev'd, 532 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Hickey-Mitchell Co., 372 F. Supp. 1117,
1120-21 (E.D. Mo. 1973), aff'd, 507 F.2d 944 (8th Cir. 1974); EEOC v. New York Times
Broadcasting Serv., Inc., 364 F. Supp. 651, 653 (W.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd
and remanded in part, 542 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1976).
248 382 F. Supp. at 799-800. The court recognized the existence of contrary deci247
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The first case indicating that the EEOC could expand its complaint beyond what the aggrieved party apparently had standing to
charge was EEOC v. E.I. DuPont de Neinours & Co.249 As previously
discussed, this case took a broad approach to the scope of an EEOC
investigation, holding that anything reasonably related to the charge
was the proper subject of an investigation. 250 In DuPont, a charge
had been filed alleging racial discrimination in the hiring policies at
one location. 25 1 The EEOC, however, found reasonable cause to believe that racial discrimination was practiced at another location as
well. 252 After conciliation had failed, the Commission instituted suit
to remedy employment discrimination affecting various positions at

both locations. 25 3 DuPont moved for summary judgment, contending that the scope of the Commission's complaint was overbroad in

that the EEOC had not complied with the conditions precedent regarding all of the allegations contained in the complaint. 25 4 It further
contended that the Commission's action must be limited solely to the
discrimination alleged by the charging party which concerned a par-

25 5
ticular class of workers at one location.
The district court denied the motion, and upheld the scope of
the complaint insofar as it reflected a determination of probable cause
which had been the subject of conciliation. 25 6 The court was of the
opinion that the administrative procedures of investigation, probable

sions such as Latino v. Rainbo Bakers, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 870, 872 (D. Colo. 1973). 382
F. Supp. at 800. In that case, the district court permitted an action by the EEOC to be
based on sex discrimination despite the fact that the aggrieved party had been a woman
who had charged discrimination based on national origin. 358 F. Supp. at 871-72. However, the Western Electric court cautioned that it felt Latino was distinguishable on the
ground that the EEOC had followed all its procedural guidelines according full due
process to the employer. Id. at 800; see note 243 supra.
Other district court decisions which are cited in Western Electric, or which have
followed its logic have been reversed. E.g., EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 380 F.
Supp. 1106 (W.D. Tenn. 1974), rev'd, 511 F.2d 1352 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
994 (1975); EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 757 (W.D. Va. 1974), rev'd, 532
F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1976).
The appeal of the Western Electric decision was dismissed by stipulation of the
parties. EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 530 F.2d 590, 595 n.14 (4th Cir. 1976).
249 373 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Del. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 516 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir.
1975).
250 Id. at 1335-36. The investigation should proceed to the "root source of discrimination." Id. at 1336.
251 Id. at 1335.
252 Id. at 1336-38.

253 Id. at 1340.
254 Id. at 1322, 1332-33.
255 Id. at 1332-33.
256 Id. at 1336-39.
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cause determination, and conciliation, measured against the language
and purpose of Title VII in granting enforcement powers to the
EEOC, are variables that determine the propriety of an EEOC
complaint. 25 7 The Sanchez ruling on the function of the investigation
was, in the court's opinion, the test to be applied to a determination
of reasonable cause including employment practices not contained in
the charge but arising from or related to the charge. 258 Since under
Sanchez, the scope of this investigation "was [not] impermissibly
broad" in the discovery of practices not specifically relating to the
charging party, the determination of reasonable cause arising from
the investigation was proper. 259 Therefore, the court held that because the entire reasonable cause determination was conciliated, the
probable cause determination was the proper basis of the EEOC
suit. 2 60 The EEOC was permitted to maintain an action to remedy

employment discrimination at both locations regarding job positions
26 1
other than that of the charging party.
The most exhaustive analysis of the relationship between the
scope of an EEOC action and standing can be found in the Fourth
Circuit opinion in EEOC v. General Electric Co. 262 Two charges
were filed by black males, both alleging racial discrimination: one
charge dealt with promotions and job transfers, the other dealt with
hiring. 2 63 Investigation of the two charges disclosed reasonable cause
to believe that General Electric had discriminated by race in job
transfers and promotions, but found no reasonable cause to believe
264
that General Electric was engaged in race discrimination in hiring.
Additionally the investigation uncovered that General Electric maintained sexually discriminatory policies. 2 65 Conciliation on all these
findings was unsuccessful, and subsequently, a complaint was brought
266
on separate counts of race and sex.
The district court dismissed the sex discrimination count, reasoning that the EEOC lacked standing to seek remedies for sex discrimi257 Id. at 1334, 1336.
258 Id. at 1334-36. The court rejected the EEOC's contentions that it could litigate
issues uncovered after a finding of probable cause. Id. at 1336.
259 Id. at 1336.

See id. at 1324, 1333-34, 1336-38.
Id. at 1338.
262 532 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1976).
263 Id. at 362.
264 Id.
260
261

265

Id.

266

Id. General Electric had "reserved the right to refuse to consider conciliation of

any 'unrelated charges . . . beyond the original charge [of racial discrimination].' " 1(.
(brackets in original).
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nation because neither of the male charging parties had standing to
raise issues of sex discrimination. 2 67 As an alternative reason for dismissal, the district court said that General Electric had been prejudiced by the EEOC's failure to file a separate charge of sex discrimination which would have given General Electric notice of the
2 68
charge prior to conciliation proceedings.
The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court had
overemphasized the nature of the charges filed and the concept of
standing. 26 9 Instead, the Fourth Circuit held that the proper scope of
an EEOC action is to be determined not by the charge, but by facts
uncovered during a reasonable investigation of the charge. 270 The
court held that the EEOC was not required to file a new charge
based upon discrimination not alleged in the original charge, provided that the reasonable cause determination encompassed discrimination discovered during the investigation. 2 7 1 The link or nexus beEEOC v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 757, 761-62 (W.D. Va. 1974).
Id. at 762-63. The district court felt that the failure to file a separate charge
would prejudice General Electric by exposing it to liability for back pay from the time
the original charge was filed. 376 F. Supp. at 762-63. The Fourth Circuit discounted
this reasoning, but said that it would indeed be prejudicial to require back pay from
more than two years prior to the time that General Electric was notified of the charge.
532 F.2d at 371-72 (relying upon Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)).
269 532 F.2d at 362-64.
270 Id. at 366. The court said: "The charge is not . . . a [form of] common-law pleading that strictly cabins the investigation that results therefrom, or the reasonable cause
determination that may be rested on that investigation." Id. at 364; accord, EEOC v.
Occidental Life Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 533, 541-42 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd on other grounds,
432 U.S. 355 (1977); EEOC v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 511 F.2d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1975);
EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1363 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
994 (1975); EEOC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 373 F. Supp. 1321, 1335-36 (D.
Del. 1974); cf. Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32, 35, 38 (4th Cir. 1971) (private
action); Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970) (private
action).
271 532 F.2d at 366. The court justified its conclusion on two grounds. First, it stated
that its opinion in Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1971), essentially
had come to the same conclusion when it stated that
"evidence [developed in the investigation] concerning employment practices
other than those specifically charged by complainants may properly be considered by the Commission in framing a remedy . . . and the Commission may, in
the public interest, provide relief which goes beyond the limited interests of
the charging parties."
438 F.2d at 42 (brackets in original) (quoting from Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC, 418
F.2d 335, 338 (6th Cir. 1969)). Since Graniteville dealt mainly with the scope of an
investigation, one could question the validity of the General Electric court's reliance on
this prior decision.
The second justification for the court's decision was its recognition of decisions
holding that a judgment may be based on facts admitted by express or implied consent
as long as there is no prejudice. 532 F.2d at 366-68; see, e.g., Norris v. Bovina Feeders,
267
268
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tween the charge and the civil action, then, is the investigation. 2 72
General Electric claimed that it had suffered prejudice by not
being provided with an opportunity to comment upon the sex discrimination claim before the reasonable cause determination had
been made, 2 73 The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument and held
that by producing the information requested of it during the investigation, the claim of sex discrimination became "obvious" 274 and
therefore comment was unnecessary. 2 7 5 The implication of the holdInc., 492 F.2d 502, 505-06 (5th Cir. 1974); O'Brien v. Moriarity, 489 F.2d 941, 943 (1st
Cir. 1974); Brown v. Ward, 438 F.2d 1285, 1286 (4th Cir. 1970); Petersen v. Klos, 426
F.2d 199, 202-03 (5th Cir. 1970); Wasik v. Borg, 423 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1970); Purofied
Down Products Corp. v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 278 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1960);
Psinakis v. Psinakis, 221 F.2d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 1955). Since General Electric had
given information to the EEOC during the investigation and had attempted conciliation
of the discrimination uncovered, there was no reason to dismiss the sex discrimination
count absent a showing of prejudice. 532 F.2d at 368-72; see 3 MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 15.13[2], at 984-85 (2d ed. 1974 & 1976-77 Cum. Supp.).
The Fourth Circuit also compared the EEOC action with similar NLRB proceedings. 532 F.2d at 367-68. The test to determine the proper scope of an NLRB action is
essentially the same one as that developed by the Fourth Circuit for determining the
proper scope of an EEOC complaint: "whether, on the entire record, the new charge
appears to be one 'initiated' by the agency or one that grows reasonably out of the
investigation of the initial charge." Id. at 368; see NLRB v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S.
301, 308-09 (1959); NLRB v. Rex Disposables, 494 F.2d 588, 590 (5th Cir. 1974). Because it may appear that the validity of this comparison is somewhat strained since the
NLRB has adjudicatory powers while the EEOC has none, the court made two observations. The mandatory trial de novo after the failure of conciliation efforts should protect
an employer from prejudicial determinations of probable cause. 532 F.2d at 370; see
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). Second, the investigatory
powers of the EEOC were copied to a great extent from those of the NLRB. See notes
21, 62 supra. Therefore, it would be illogical to hold that the scope of an EEOC action
should be other than the scope of an NLRB action.
The dissenting opinion in Genieral Electric did not accept the majority's belief that
a trial de novo would remove any prejudice suffered by an employer as a result of a
failure to file a new charge. Judge Widener felt that both Title VII and the EEOC's own
internal regulations required notification to an employer in such situations before a
reasonable cause determination is made. 532 F.2d at 375; see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.14
(1976). The dissent disagreed with that part of the majority's analysis which placed little
emphasis on the words of the charge and much emphasis on the Sanchez rule. 532 F.2d
at 377-78. Judge Widener sought to distinguish Sanchez by stating that the words of the
original charge in Sanchez contained enough information to comprise the eventual
complaint, whereas the charges filed against General Electric contained no reference to
sex discrimination. Id. at 377-78. The dissenting opinion indicates that anything short of
actual notice and ability to respond to charges of discrimination is prejudicial to an
employer. See id. at 380.
272 532 F.2d at 368.

273 Id. at 368-69. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.14 (1976) provides that the respondent (employer) have an opportunity to state its position on the allegations.
274 532 F.2d at 369 (emphasis in original).
275 See id. at 368-69. The court held this conclusion to be especially evident be-
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ing is that an employer cannot claim prejudice due to lack of notice of
those claims developed from evidence uncovered by a reasonable investigation of the original charges since, by the very fact of supplying
the information, the employer is on notice that the information may
2 76
be evidence of discrimination.
The General Electric court further held that the standing of the
charging party was an immaterial consideration in any EEOC action
since the basic purpose of the 1972 amendments to Title VII had
been to give the EEOC the right to sue to vindicate the public interest in eradicating employment discrimination. 2 7 7 To view the statute otherwise would, in the court's opinion, render the 1972 amendments meaningless

2

78

cause of the natural tendency to investigate a charge to the " 'root source.' " Id. (quoting
from EEOC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 373 F. Supp. 1321, 1336 (D. Del. 1974)).
Since the root source of racial discrimination in hiring practices might be preemployment tests, the discovery that those tests tend to foster some other form of discrimination, such as sex discrimination, was not viewed to be either surprising or prejudicial. 532 F.2d at 369.
276 See id. at 370. The court noted that in any case, General Electric had an opportunity to conciliate on the sex discrimination determination which was held to be adequate compliance with 29 C.F.R. § 1601.14 (1976). See 532 F.2d at 371.
277 532 F.2d at 372-73.
278 Id. at 373. The Fourth Circuit directed that all pre-amendment decisions that
impose standing limitations in Title VII actions are of no effect where the EEOC is the
litigating part'. See id.at 374. The General Electric decision was followed in EEOC v.
Raymond Metal Products Co., 530 F.2d 590, 597 (4th Cir. 1976).
Following the General Electric decision, only the Ninth Circuit has considered the
proper scope of an EEOC action and its relationship to principles of standing. In EEOC
v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 432
U.S. 355 (1977), a married woman filed a charge with the EEOC alleging sex discrimination. 535 F.2d at 540, 542. Investigation revealed evidence of discrimination against
unmarried females regarding " 'pregnancy-related benefits' " and against male employees' retirement plans. Id. at 540-41. These findings were included in the complaint,
but only after Occidental had received notice of the findings and conciliation had been
attempted on those issues. Id. at 542. The district court dismissed the two subparagraphs of the complaint which alleged discrimination against unmarried women and
against males since there was no reference to them in the original charge. Id. at 535,
540-41. The Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the investigation determined the
scope of an EEOC action, quoting the General Electric decision. Id. at 541. The court
felt that the investigation was reasonable and that it uncovered certain evidence which
led to the two disputed counts in the complaint. Id. at 541. The court noted that Occidental must have thought the investigation was reasonable since it did not contest the
EEOC's demand for evidence. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (Supp. V 1975). Finally, the
Ninth Circuit mentioned the other circuit opinions which had set the precedent: EEOC
v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 511 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 511 F.2d 1352 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975). 535 F.2d at 541. Although the court recognized that the EEOC could have filed a new charge after making its investigatory discoveries, it felt that requiring such a procedure would be wasteful of judicial resources and violative of the statutory purposes. Id. at 542. It was also
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CONCLUSION

It is apparent that the congressional purpose behind the enactment of Title VII was the elimination of employment discrimination
based on an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Although it is clear that the statutory framework developed by Congress has not yet succeeded in achieving that goal, the fault does not
lie with the law's enforcement by the federal courts. There is general
agreement among the circuit courts that plaintiffs should not be frustrated in the prosecution of Title VII actions by rigid adherence to
technical niceties or restrictive interpretations of the scope of a
charge, investigation or civil action. The underlying theme which
emerges in an analysis of Title VII cases is that the district courts
should provide a forum for an adjudication on the merits of Title VII
causes of action.

When faced with procedural questions regarding the scope of an
EEOC or private action, the overwhelming majority of the circuits

have upheld the validity of the Title VII action. Although there is a
substantial divergence of approaches to the resolution of this problem, the uniformity of result is derived from the courts' attempts to
execute the remedial purposes of Title VII.

The most significant case exploring the relationship between the
EEOC and Title VII litigation is General Electric v. EEOC. The
General Electric court was the first circuit court to recognize and expand upon the EEOC's role as vindicator of the public right to freedom from employment discrimination.

noted that standing was not an issue since the EEOC sues for "the vindication of public
policy," unrestrained by standing of the charging party. 1I.
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the Occidental decision on other grounds,
432 U.S. at 358-66, the opinion stated that
under the procedural structure created by the 1972 amendments, the EEOC
does not function simply as a vehicle for conducting litigation on behalf of private parties; it is a federal administrative agency charged with the responsibility of investigating claims of employment discrimination and settling disputes,
if possible, in an informal, noncoercive fashion.
Id. at 368. This excerpt clearly supports the statements found in General Electric v.
EEOC, 532 F.2d at 372-73, and echoed by the Ninth Circuit in Occidental, 535 F.2d at
542, that the EEOC sues to vindicate the societal interest by eradicating the discrimination prohibited by Title VII. See EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 553 F.2d 579, 580-81 (9th Cir.
1977).
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit has indicated that despite the possibility of mootness
of the aggrieved party's charge, the EEOC may continue its action where there is an
"inference of a pattern of discrimination." EEOC v. New York Times Broadcasting
Serv., Inc., 542 F.2d 356, 360 (6th Cir. 1976).
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The private action remains a viable alternative remedy. One may
infer from the Gamble court's decision, that when faced with a motion to dismiss on technical grounds, the courts will resolve it in such
a manner as to enable a private party to obtain a remedy. The
Sanchez exhortation that procedural questions are to be resolved in
favor of the private litigant continues to be followed as an expression
of public policy. Furthermore, where a private party brings an action,
the scope of that action can be defined either in terms of the investigation or through extrapolation from the charge itself. From an examination of the Title VII litigation, it is evident that employers
should not hope to avoid litigation of such actions by arguing that the
scope of the action is too broad, or that the investigation is too broad,
or that there is a lack of standing, in situations similar to the facts of
the cases discussed in the Comment.
Bradley M. Jones

